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Abstract
The solvability of the problem of fair exchange in a synchronous system subject
to Byzantine failures is investigated in this work. The fair exchange problem
arises when a group of processes are required to exchange digital items in a
fair manner, which means that either each process obtains the item it was
expecting or no process obtains any information on the inputs of others.
After introducing a novel specification of fair exchange that clearly separates
safety and liveness, we give an overview of the difficulty of solving such a
problem in the context of a fully-connected topology. On one hand, we show
that no solution to fair exchange exists in the absence of an identified process
that every process can trust a priori; on the other, a well-known solution to
fair exchange relying on a trusted third party is recalled. These two results
lead us to complete our system model with a flexible representation of the
notion of trust. We then show that fair exchange is solvable if and only if a
connectivity condition, named the reachable majority condition, is satisfied.
The necessity of the condition is proven by an impossibility result and its
sufficiency by presenting a general solution to fair exchange relying on a set of
trusted processes.
The focus is then turned towards a specific network topology in order to pro-
vide a fully decentralized, yet realistic, solution to fair exchange. The general
solution mentioned above is optimized by reducing the computational load as-
sumed by trusted processes as far as possible. Accordingly, our fair exchange
protocol relies on trusted tamperproof modules that have limited communica-
tion abilities and are only required in key steps of the algorithm. This modular
solution is then implemented in the context of a pedagogical application devel-
oped for illustrating and apprehending the complexity of fair exchange. This
application, which also includes the implementation of a wide range of Byzan-
tine behaviors, allows executions of the algorithm to be set up and monitored
through a graphical display.
Surprisingly, some of our results on fair exchange seem contradictory with
those found in the literature of secure multiparty computation, a problem from
the field of modern cryptography, although the two problems have much in
common. Both problems are closely related to the notion of trusted third party,
but their approaches and descriptions differ greatly. By introducing a common
specification framework, a comparison is proposed in order to clarify their
differences and the possible origins of the confusion between them. This leads
us to introduce the problem of generalized fair computation, a generalization of
fair exchange. Finally, a solution to this new problem is given by generalizing
our modular solution to fair exchange.
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1Introduction
A child of five would understand this.
Send someone to fetch a child of five.
Groucho Marx
Context
In real life, distributed systems are composed of many and varied elements
of infrastructure. For example, computers do not all provide the same com-
putational power or storage capacity. Studying such systems from a general
standpoint must therefore rely on basic abstractions to capture the essence of
distributed systems [GR06d].
Process
An example of a distributed system.
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Modeling Distributed Systems
A distributed system consists of a set of computers linked by communication
channels, so the two primary abstractions are respectively processes and links,
as illustrated in the figure above. In order to represent real conditions, both
these abstractions are characterized by failure models, i.e., descriptions of the
possible failures that may be exhibited. Instances of the process abstraction
are distinguished by their behaviors.
• Crash-stop failures — In this form of failure, processes are either correct
or crashed. However once they have crashed, they do not go back to
being correct.
• Crash-recovery failures — This definition of failure allows for recovering
from a crash. A good process is one that either never crashes or eventually
stops crashing. All others are said to be bad [ACT98].
• Byzantine failures1 — With Byzantine failures, processes may exhibit
any kind of behavior. This includes crash-stop and crash-recovery failures
and more specifically malicious ones, i.e., resulting from the purposeful
design of an adversary.
Similarly, instances of the link abstraction may vary with respect to their levels
of reliability, since messages can be lost during transit through the network.
• Fair-loss — This type of link ensures that messages are not systemat-
ically dropped during the transmission. However there is no guarantee
that a given message will reach its destination.
• Perfect — With perfect links, messages are reliably delivered, i.e., the
message is eventually received if both the sender and the receiver are
correct. Moreover, messages are delivered only once and no message is
delivered if it was not previously sent by some process.
A third basic dimension characterizing distributed systems concerns timing
assumptions, i.e., process speeds and communication delays.
• Asynchronous — This definition indicates that there are no timing as-
sumptions whatsoever made about the system.
1Also sometimes called arbitrary failures. The term Byzantine comes from an analogy
introduced in [LSP82] to discuss the problem of reaching agreement among processes that
may lie to each other.
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• Synchronous — In the case of a synchronous system, there are upper
bounds on the processing and transmission delays, and each process has
a local clock which only deviates from others at a bounded rate.
These failure models provide an overview of those commonly found in the
literature [GR06d], nevertheless, none of the lists is exhaustive. While various
combinations of the three categories are valid system models, in this thesis we
consider a synchronous distributed system with Byzantine failures and perfect
links.
Common Problems in Distributed Systems
Independently of the definition of the system model, a wide range of problems
are studied in the field of distributed systems. The problems of consensus
and reliable broadcast are arguably the cornerstones of the domain. While the
former allows processes to agree on a common value belonging to the set of
values that each process has proposed, the latter provides a means of reliably
sending a message to a group of processes. Both these problems have been
heavily studied and come in many variants, such as best-effort broadcast, causal
broadcast, regular consensus and uniform consensus to name a few [GR06d].
A particular instance of consensus is the problem of non-blocking atomic com-
mit (NBAC) [GHM+99], in which, according to how things went, each process
votes either YES, to commit some local computations, or NO, to abort them.
Moreover, besides achieving termination for all good processes, an important
property of NBAC is that it is biased towards abort, i.e., in order to commit
all processes must have voted YES.
In this thesis, we propose to study the problem of fair exchange, which is
closely related to the problem of non-blocking atomic commit [AGG+04]. Fair
exchange consists in allowing processes to exchange a digital item in a fair
manner. Terms of the exchange are known a priori, so processes offer an item
and expect one in exchange. The outcome of the exchange is fair if either all
the processes obtain the expected item or no process receives anything.
Motivation
In the modern world, the notions of fair exchange and trust are ubiquitous:
every day, without even noticing, we participate in numerous commercial ex-
changes, which we expect to be fair (and most actually are). Fundamental to
these exchanges is the notion of trust. In the physical world, this trust is sup-
ported by the identification and the implicit reputation of tangible exchange
4 Introduction
partners. In the digital world, on the contrary, fair exchange is a surprisingly
difficult problem. This can be explained by the lack of trust that character-
izes the digital realm. Yet, fair exchange is a fundamental problem that has
constantly been studied over the past decades and that has recently regained
interest [AGG+04, AGGV05, AV03]. This is partly due to the advent of m-
business2 as a natural evolution of e-business, i.e., extending the possibilities
of e-business through the use of mobile devices, e.g., cellular phones. When it
comes to solving fair exchange in such semi-open environments, i.e., where all
parties are not necessarily identified a priori, carefully modeling and analyzing
trust relationships between processes is a key issue.
Most successful e-business solutions today follow a classical (centralized) client-
server architecture. This implies that current e-business solutions somehow
fail to take full advantage of the Internet’s underlying protocols, which were
designed to support fully decentralized approaches.3 For example, current
e-business solutions do not provide a favorable environment for electronic ex-
changes in the absence of some centralized and trusted server, i.e., they fail to
support peer-to-peer only settings. On the other hand, the emergence of mobile
devices and ad hoc networks, which often have to operate in a disconnected
manner with respect to the Internet, is forcing us to reconsider the current
e-business architectures. In that respect, we maintain that fair exchange is
a keystone for peer-to-peer m-business interactions at the middleware level.
By studying the solvability of fair exchange in various contexts, and more
specifically in decentralized ones, this thesis proposes fair exchange as a basic
building-block and as a first step towards achieving peer-to-peer m-business
solutions.
Contribution
This thesis discusses the solvability of the problem of fair exchange and some
related aspects. Its contribution is threefold, respectively divided into the
three parts of the structure illustrated on page 6, and mostly based on three
published companion papers [GR06a, GR06b, GR06c] and a technical report,
which is currently under review in an international conference at the time of
writing [GR07].
2Mobile-business, i.e., business pursued by relying on the infrastructure provided by
mobile technology, such as mobile phones.
3The ARPANET project aimed at building a network with no single point of failure, in
order to survive a nuclear strike.
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Part I: Problem & Solvability. The first contribution of the thesis is to
present a study of the solvability of fair exchange in a general context and its
links with the notion of trust. In doing this, we introduce a novel specification
of the problem of fair exchange. By first assuming a general system model
where no process can be trusted, we show that there is no solution to the
problem of fair exchange. Two documented solutions both relying on some
sort of trusted entity – the trusted third party (TTP) [BP90] and the guardian
angels [AV03] – lead us to propose an extension of the general model to include
a flexible representation of the notion of trust. In this new model, we show a
connectivity condition, both necessary and sufficient, for fair exchange, named
the reachable majority condition. Sufficiency is proved by presenting a general
solution achieving fair exchange under the reachable majority condition.
Part II: Solution & Implementation. While the reachable majority con-
dition requires a minimum level of trust in order for fair exchanges to occur,
our second contribution is to provide a fully-decentralized, yet realistic, solu-
tion to fair exchange. As in the guardian angels solution [AV03], the context
is that of a network topology of fully connected processes, each hosting a tam-
perproof module that can therefore be trusted. However, in order to propose a
solution as realistic as possible, the embedded tamperproof modules are only
used in limited key steps of the protocol. This solution is then implemented
in the context of a pedagogical visualization tool, in which executions of our
fair exchange protocol can be configured with various settings, such as the
behaviors of each process, and monitored through a graphical display.
Part III: Comparison & Generalization. Our third contribution is to
propose a comparison of fair exchange and the problem of secure multiparty
computation. Indeed, these two problems are apparently similar but certain
results found in their respective literature are confusingly contradictory. The
wide differences of description and approach in their respective research fields
render a straightforward comparison hazardous. Our first step is thus to in-
troduce a common specification framework and, using this, revisit the descrip-
tions of both problems. The gap between fair exchange and secure multiparty
computation then leads us to describe a third problem, i.e., generalized fair
computation, which is a generalization of the problem of fair exchange. We
thus present a generalization of our solution to fair exchange that solves the
newly introduced problem.
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Structure
The thesis is divided into six chapters, two in each part, as illustrated on
page 6. This representation of the structure is recalled at the beginning of
each chapter. As there is no chapter specifically dedicated to the related work,
each chapter starts with an introductory section which discusses research work
that is close to ours, while setting the context and linking the current chapter
to previous ones.
The figure of page 6 also illustrates the logical connections between the chap-
ters. As shown, the first three chapters link together linearly since, in these,
theoretical aspects of the problem of fair exchange and its solvability are dis-
cussed sequentially. Chapter 4 is linked to Chapter 3 since it offers a con-
crete Java implementation of the solution of that chapter. However, Chap-
ter 4 stands somewhat apart from the others, as it presents aspects related
to fair exchange that are more practical. Since the implementation does not
come with performance results, the research contributions of the chapter are
weaker. The reader may therefore choose to postpone reading it and continue
with Chapters 5 and 6, which discuss theoretical aspects logically linked to
those of Chapter 1. By comparing definition and specification aspects of fair
exchange and secure multiparty computation, the last two chapters address
the confusing similarity of the two problems.
While these last chapters, which deal with related work, could have come
sooner in the thesis, this structure allows us to focus directly on the solvability
of fair exchange. Moreover, as comparison with secure multiparty computation
started when our first results on the solvability of fair exchange were challenged
by reviewers from the field of modern cryptography, it also corresponds to the
chronology of our research.
Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 introduces a novel specification of the problem of fair exchange
relying on a set of elemental properties and presents a first impossibility result
stating that fair exchange is impossible in the absence of trust.
Chapter 2 extends the system model by adding flexible elements capturing the
notion of trust. In this new model, it shows that a necessary and sufficient
condition for solving fair exchange is a connectivity condition implying that
correct processes have reliable access to a majority of the elements of trust.
A general solution to the problem of fair exchange is presented as part of the
proof of the sufficiency of the condition.
Chapter 3 focuses on a specific topology of the extended model to propose a
8 Introduction
realistic decentralized solution to fair exchange. By relying on tamperproof
secure modules for only key steps of the protocol but nonetheless providing
the required trust, our modular solution achieves fair exchange in the context
of an honest majority.
By providing both an implementation of the modular solution presented in
Chapter 3 and a graphical user interface, Chapter 4 presents a pedagogical
visualization tool for monitoring specific executions of fair exchange. The
application provides an interesting instrument for apprehending the difficulty
of fair exchange. Chapter 4 also presents a general approach to implementing
a wide range of Byzantine behaviors, as is indeed necessary for illustration
purposes. From a research contribution perspective, this chapter is somewhat
weaker than the others as it does not for example provide performance results.
Chapter 5 proposes a comparison of fair exchange and secure multiparty com-
putation, a similar problem coming from the research fields of modern cryptog-
raphy. After a brief presentation of the problem of secure multiparty compu-
tation, highlighting the heterogeneity of approach and specification of the two
problems, a common specification framework is introduced. The problems are
then revisited using the new framework, allowing a more accurate comparison.
Directly deriving from the comparison of Chapter 5, Chapter 6 proposes a
generalization of fair exchange, named generalized fair computation. Based
on the solution of Chapter 3 with secure boxes, a general solution to the new
problem is then presented.
♦♦♦
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Chapter 1
Fair Exchange
The devil hides in details.
Swiss Proverb
Abstract. This chapter presents the problem of fair exchange, and gives a first
overview of the difficulty of solving such a problem in the context of a fully-connected
synchronous distributed system. Our first contribution is a novel specification of the
fair exchange problem that clearly separates safety and liveness. In the context of
a synchronous model where processes communicate by message passing and might
behave maliciously, it is shown that no solution to fair exchange exists in the absence
of an identified process that every process can trust a priori. This trust-related
impossibility result constitutes the second contribution of this chapter. Finally, we
discuss a well-known solution to the problem of fair exchange relying on a trusted
third party.
1.1 Introduction
Various specifications of the fair exchange problem have been proposed, with
sets of properties differing slightly [ASW00, Ate99, AGGV05, FR97,Mic03,
PG99, RRN05], particularly in the notion of fairness, which is the most dif-
ficult to capture [MGK02, RRN05]. Most specifications are actually mean-
ingful for exchanges involving only two processes, i.e., they are impossible to
satisfy in models allowing more than one Byzantine process. Our specification
of fair exchange, on the contrary, considers the general case where more than
12 Chapter 1. Fair Exchange
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Figure 1.1: Thesis outline.
two processes might be involved. Moreover, we propose a specification relying
on six properties clearly distinguished by liveness or safety.
Besides proposing a specification or a solution, some authors also discuss the
difficulty of fair exchange and propose impossibility results in various models.
In [PG99], fair exchange is measured against consensus, and an impossibility
result on fair exchange in asynchronous models is shown by comparison with
the FLP impossibility [FLP85]. In [EY80], fair exchange is shown to be
impossible to solve deterministically in an asynchronous system with no trusted
third party (TTP). In this chapter, we show that fair exchange cannot be
solved in a synchronous model in the absence of some identified process trusted
a priori by every other process.
This chapter thus provides the context and groundwork for our study of fair
exchange and its link with trust, as recalled in Figure 1.1. To keep the field
of application as wide as possible, the context is set in a general synchronous
system model, i.e., with no specific topology or failure assumptions. It is in
this wide context that we propose our novel specification of fair exchange.
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1.2 System Model
We consider a general distributed system consisting of a set Π of n processes,
Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. As detailed hereafter, processes form a connected graph and
may exhibit Byzantine behaviors. Figure 1.2 illustrates a possible setting, with
five fully connected processes.
Process
Figure 1.2: A fully connected topology, with five processes.
1.2.1 Topology and Synchrony.
Processes are interconnected by some communication network and communi-
cate by message passing. The system is synchronous : it exhibits synchronous
computation and synchronous communication, i.e., there exist upper bounds
on processing and communication delays. We also assume the existence of
some global real time clock, whose tick range, noted T , is the set of natural
numbers. The global clock is virtual in the sense that processes do not have
access to it.
Regarding the network topology, we merely assume that processes of Π form a
connected graph. Links are reliable bidirectional communication channels, i.e.,
if both sender and receiver are correct, any message inserted in the channel
is eventually delivered by the receiver.1 Formally, such channels are said to
be perfect links (PL), which provide send and deliver primitives (respectively
PL.send() and PL.deliver() functions) and ensure the following set of proper-
ties [GR06d].
Reliable delivery. Let pi be any process that sends a message m to a pro-
cess pj. If neither pi nor pj crashes, then pj eventually delivers m.
1This somewhat counterintuitive use of the verb deliver is commonly used in the field of
distributed systems and implies that the deliver function of the receiver is triggered by the
lower layers [GR06d, HT93].
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No duplication. No message is delivered by a process more than once.
No creation. If a message m is delivered by some process pj, then m was
previously sent to pj by some process pi.
The synchronous system assumption implies that the delivery will occur within
some known time bound ∆PL.
1.2.2 Executions and Failure Patterns
The execution of an algorithm A is defined as a sequence of steps executed
by processes of Π. In each step, a process has the opportunity to perform
atomically all three following actions: (1) send a message, (2) receive a message
and (3) update its local state.2 Based on this definition, a Byzantine process
is one that deviates from A in any way, so a Byzantine process is Byzantine
against a specific algorithm A. It is a known result that Byzantine failure can
only be defined with respect to some algorithm [DGG05]. A Byzantine failure
pattern f is then defined as a function from T to 2Π where f(t) denotes a set
of Byzantine processes that have deviated from A through time t. A failure
pattern f can thus be seen as a projection of all process failures during some
execution of A. Once a process starts misbehaving, it cannot subsequently be
considered correct, i.e., f(t) ⊆ f(t + 1). All the above definitions regarding
executions and failures are similar to the models of [CT96, DGG05].
An important result regarding Byzantine failures is that they cannot be de-
tected effectively. In [DGG02], it is shown that, because of the inherent nature
of Byzantine failures, a failure detector can only be built with respect to the
algorithm using it. Contrary to crash-stop failures, Byzantine failures are not
independent of the execution of the algorithm. Thus, Byzantine processes can
only be detected once they start deviating from the algorithm they are sup-
posed to run. In other words, as long as a Byzantine process behaves according
to the algorithm, it cannot be distinguished from a correct process.
1.3 A Formal Specification of Fair Exchange
The fair exchange problem consists in a group of processes trying to exchange
digital items in a fair manner. The difficulty of the problem resides in achieving
fairness. Intuitively, fairness means that, if one process obtains the expected
digital item, then all processes involved in the exchange should also obtain
2In each step, the process can of course choose to skip any of these actions, e.g., if it has
nothing to send.
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their expected digital items. The assumption is made that each process knows
both the set Π of processes participating and the terms of the exchange.
The terms of the exchange are defined by a set Ω of pairs of processes (pi, pj)
and a set D of item descriptions, D = {d1, . . . , dn}. A description di is the
description of the item expected by process pi. Furthermore di is unique, so
if i 6= j, then di 6= dj. This restriction eliminates cases where processes are
expecting the exact same item. However, such cases can be easily addressed
by distinguishing identical items with a special tag, e.g., the ID of the offering
process. An element of Ω is a pair (pi, pj), where pj is the receiver of the
item offered by pi. Elements of Ω are defined such that pj is the image of pi
through a bijective map (or permutation) of Π, with i 6= j. Let M denote
the set of digital items actually offered during an execution of fair exchange,
M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, with mi being offered by process pi. Accordingly, for each
description in D a corresponding item inM does not necessarily exist, sinceM
includes items that might have been offered by Byzantine processes. Finally,
let desc(m) be the function returning the description of item m.
1.3.1 Fair Exchange as a Service
Fair exchange can be seen as a service allowing processes to exchange digital
items in a fair manner. Each process offers an item in exchange for a counter-
part of which it has the description. The exchange is completed when every
process releases the expected counterpart or all processes release the abort
item ϕ, meaning that the exchange has aborted. To achieve this, the service
offers the two following primitives.
offer(mi, pj) – Enables the process pi to initiate its participation in the
exchange with processes of Π by offering item mi to pj, in exchange for
the item matching description di, with di and Π known a priori.
release(x) – Works as a callback to inform the process that the exchange
is completed. Process pi receives item x, which is either an item match-
ing di or the abort item ϕ.
At the end of an exchange, we say that pi releases an item, meaning that
the service calls back the release operation of pi. This convention is similar
to the one used for typical deliver primitives, e.g., with reliable broadcast
primitives [HT93].
At the heart of our specification lies a key assumption: the release primitive is
the only way by which any process may obtain its desired item. This implies
that no process has access to its desired item until it is safe and fair to release
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it. In other words, the item is either physically or virtually out of reach, i.e.,
it is stored in some unaccessible address space, or it is stored locally but in
encrypted form using a key that the local process does not hold.
1.3.2 Fair Exchange Properties
We now specify the formal properties of the fair exchange problem. While
several other specifications exist in the literature [AGGV05, AV03, PG99],
our specification differs in that it separates safety and liveness via fine-grained
properties. Such elemental properties then allow us to reason more precisely
about the correctness of our solution.
Validity. If a correct process pi releases an item x, then either x ∈ M and x
matches di, or x is the abort item ϕ. (safety)
Uniqueness. No correct process releases more than once. (safety)
Non-triviality. If all processes are correct, no process releases the abort
item ϕ. (safety)
Termination. Every correct process eventually releases an item. (liveness)
Integrity. No process pj releases an item mi, with process pi correct, if mi
matches description dk of some correct process pk, with pk 6= pj. (safety)
Fairness. If any process pi releases an item mj matching description di, with
pi or pj correct, then every correct process pk releases an item matching
its description dk. (safety)
Of these six properties, the last two, integrity and fairness, are specific to the
problem of fair exchange and define precisely the possible outcomes of fair
exchange algorithms. The integrity property ensures that no process obtains
an item offered by a correct process and matching the description of some
other correct process. This does not prevent a Byzantine process from illicitly
obtaining the item destined for or offered by some other Byzantine process,
since such a behavior cannot be prevented and does not prejudice any correct
process. The fairness property guarantees that if any process obtains its ex-
pected item offered by some other process, with at least one of them being
correct, then every correct process also obtains its expected item. In other
words this property prevents a Byzantine process from taking advantage of
a correct process but does not protect other Byzantine processes from their
own incorrect behaviors. More trivially, it also ensures that no correct process
takes advantage of any process, correct or not.
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Note that neither of these properties takes into account the case where a Byzan-
tine process tries to guess the value of one or more items. However, we exclude
this guessing game case, since the probability of guessing can be made arbi-
trarily low, as is the case in any cryptography-based guarantees [Gol04].
The definition of fairness described above is sometimes characterized by the
terms true, perfect or deterministic in order to distinguish it from definitions
such as weak fairness [RR02] or probabilistic fairness [AV03]. The weak fair-
ness property does not require the exchange to be fair but rather that correct
processes are able to gather evidence of potential misbehaviors, whereas the
probabilistic one only ensures fairness with a certain probability.
Other specifications of fair exchange usually rely on a single property to cap-
ture the notion of true fairness [ASW00, AGGV05, PG99]. However, we
argue that if those specifications are suitable for cases where n = 2, they are
impossible to satisfy in models allowing more than one Byzantine process.
In [AGGV05], for example, the fairness property requires that if any correct
process does not obtain its item, then no process obtains any items from any
other process. This is clearly unsustainable in the presence of two or more
Byzantine processes because one cannot prevent two Byzantine processes from
conspiring in order for one of them to obtain the item of the second one. A
simple but flawed remedy would be to modify this definition as follows: if any
correct process does not obtain its item, then no process obtains any items
from any correct process. While at first it seems correct, this definition of fair-
ness allows a correct process to obtain the item of a Byzantine process, even
if other correct processes do not obtain anything. Hence, this specification is
still flawed.
1.4 Limitation of the Model
With the context set and the problem defined, there remains the question of
solving fair exchange. The difficulty of this resides in ensuring fairness to
all correct processes. In this section, we show first that ensuring fairness is
impossible without at least one trusted process, even when assuming a syn-
chronous system and a fully connected topology. We then present a simple
solution found in the literature [BP90], which indeed relies on a trusted pro-
cess, named trusted third party (TTP). This process does not take part in the
exchange but simply provides the sufficient level of trust for ensuring fairness.
We conclude by questioning the necessity of a TTP, i.e., is there some trust
setting, weaker than a TTP but sufficient nonetheless for fair exchange?
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1.4.1 Impossibility Result
In [EY80], fair exchange is shown to have no solution in an asynchronous
model prone to Byzantine failures. In Theorem 1 below, we prove that the fair
exchange problem has no deterministic solution, if there is no trusted process,
even in the context of a perfectly synchronous model. In our model, no such
assumption is made about any process of Π, i.e., each process is potentially
correct or Byzantine.
Definition 1 (Trusted Process). A process that is known to be correct a priori
by all the other processes, i.e., all processes know that this process will not
deviate from its expected behavior.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that an item is in-
divisible, i.e., it cannot be sent in pieces. Allowing items to be broken into
pieces, e.g., using techniques from [Sha79], does not ensure fairness unless
assumptions are made that each process has the same computational power
and that receiving only partial data from an item is not entirely useless. If
such is not the case, this technique then faces the same fair exchange problem
when sending the last piece of item. In any case, since we are concerned with
true fairness, the indivisible item assumption does not reduce the scope of im-
possibility. Again for simplicity, we also assume that the item is not ciphered
in order to prevent the receiver from having immediate access to it, e.g., by
encrypting it with the private key of the sender, since it does not help in any
way to solve the problem. Indeed, having to exchange the keys in a fair manner
in order for the processes to decipher the items would again produce the same
fair exchange problem. Nonetheless, an item may still be encrypted with the
public key of the receiver to prevent other processes from intercepting it.
Theorem 1. In the context of a synchronous model with Byzantine failures,
there is no deterministic solution to the fair exchange problem, if there is no
trusted process, even in the presence of only a single Byzantine process.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some algorithm A solves fair exchange and that there is no trusted
process. Consider an execution E of A in which all processes are correct. From
the non-triviality, termination and validity properties of fair exchange, in E,
every process releases its desired item, and in particular, some process pi re-
leases item mj, with mj matching description di and (pj, pi) ∈ Ω, and some
process pk releases item mi, with mi matching description dk and (pi, pk) ∈ Ω.
Now, since no process can be trusted and Byzantine processes cannot be de-
tected a priori, in any execution, no process other than pi and pk may hold
item mi. Thus we know that in a previous step of E, pk receives mi from pi.
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We now consider the two following cases: either (a) pi sends mi after receiving
mj or (b) pi sends mi before receiving mj.
Case (a). Since there is no trusted process, if pi sends mi after receiving mj,
we can derive an execution E ′, similar to E, in which pi is Byzantine
and deviates from A after receiving mj by omitting to send mi and by
releasing mj. Since no process is trusted, in E
′, no process other than
pi holds mi. Thus, from the no creation property of perfect links, pk
never receives and thus never releases mi. To satisfy the validity and
termination properties, in E ′, pk releases ϕ but thus violates fairness.
Thus, in E, pi sends mi before receiving mj. Furthermore, this is true
for every process, so from the definition of Ω and by circular reasoning,
in E, all items are sent roughly at the same time. This now leaves us
with case (b).
Case (b). We know that, in E, pi sends mi before receiving mj and that
all items are sent roughly at the same time. Now, since there is no
trusted process, we can derive an execution E ′′, similar to E, in which
pj is Byzantine and deviates from A by omitting to send mj. Since all
items are sent at the same time, pj receives and releases some item mx
matching dj. From the fact that no process can be trusted to hold any
item other than its own, in E ′′, we know that no process other than
pj holds mj. Thus, from the no creation property of perfect links, pi
never receives and thus never releases mj. To satisfy the validity and
termination properties, in E ′′, pi releases ϕ but thus violates fairness.
Therefore, algorithm A does not solve fair exchange. A contradiction.
1.4.2 The Trusted Third Party (TTP)
A simple solution to the problem of fair exchange is to introduce a trusted third
party (TTP) and most solutions indeed rely on this in some form. A TTP is a
trusted process directly accessible to all processes, as shown in Figure 1.3. Fair-
ness is thus trivially ensured by having processes send their items to the TTP,
which forwards the items, if the terms of the exchange are fulfilled [BP90].
A TTP brings synchronism and control over terms of the exchange in order
to ensure fairness but constitutes a bottleneck and a single point of failure.
Moreover, such a centralized solution is unrealistic in the context of a full
peer-to-peer system, e.g., as in ad hoc networks.
For this reason, various so-called optimistic algorithms have been proposed
which only involve the TTP when something goes wrong, i.e., when an attempt
to cheat is detected [ASW00, Mic03, BP90, BDM98, BWW00]. However
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optimistic approaches are based on the strong assumption that the environ-
ment is mostly honest, i.e., most exchanges involve correct processes only. The
TTP is thus required for the rare cases where not all processes are correct. To
weaken the role of the TTP, in [FR97] for instance, Franklin and Reiter pro-
pose a solution using a semi-trusted third party that can misbehave on its own
but does not conspire with either of the two participant peers. Similarly, the
authors of [SXL05] propose a solution based on a cluster of untrusted servers
acting as third parties. In the latter paper, however, the authors recognize
that they are merely solving a variant of the weak fair exchange.
Process
TTP
Figure 1.3: A topology relying on a centralized trusted third party (TTP).
1.4.3 How much trust is really needed?
We have seen two major results regarding fair exchange, which are illustrated
in Figure 1.4. On one hand, our impossibility result shows that in the absence
of some trusted process, fair exchange simply cannot be solved. On the other
hand, a solution from [BP90] proves that introducing a centralized trusted
third party is a strong enough assumption to ensure fairness. However, while
relying on a TTP is an effective solution, it also has its drawbacks: it implies a
centralized architecture, which is inappropriate for peer-to-peer systems, and
introduces of a single point of failure.
The question that we thus need to address is whether such a strong centralized
solution is really necessary in order to solve fair exchange. In other words, are
there not some hidden assumptions embedded in the TTP architecture that
are not strictly necessary for solving the problem of fair exchange? These first
results provide the groundwork for the next chapter, in which we propose to
study the degree of trust, both necessary and sufficient, in order to ensure that
solutions to fair exchange exist.
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TRUST LEVEL?IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE
Figure 1.4: How much trust is needed for solving fair exchange?
♦♦♦
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Chapter 2
Trust and Solvability of Fair
Exchange
To be trusted is a greater compliment than to be loved.
George MacDonald
Abstract. In this chapter, we examine the solvability of fair exchange by intro-
ducing a generic model with trust, i.e., with trusted and untrusted processes. We
then show that the solvability of fair exchange depends on a necessary and sufficient
topological condition, which we name the reachable majority condition. The first
part of this result, i.e., necessity, is captured by an impossibility result in the context
of our model with trust. The second part, i.e., sufficiency, is shown by proposing a
general solution to the fair exchange problem under the aforementioned condition.
2.1 Introduction
The notion of trust is central to the solvability of fair exchange, since, as seen
in the previous chapter, it is impossible without at least one trusted process.
Trust and its various possible settings in a distributed system are thus the focal
points of this chapter, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. By introducing a trusted
process available to all other processes, the trusted third party (TTP) setting
produces an effective solution. Moreover, the TTP provides an unconditional
solution with respect to the number of Byzantine processes. In other words,
even if there is only a single correct process facing any number of Byzantine
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Figure 2.1: Thesis outline.
processes, fairness is ensured nonetheless. However, this solution relies entirely
on a strong assumption, i.e., the reliability of the TTP.
Other approaches depart from the traditional TTP-based approach by relying
on fully decentralized tamperproof modules [AGG+04, AGGV05, AV03], i.e.,
assuming fully connected processes but embedded tamperproof modules each
dependent on its hosting process for communicating. These solutions work
by having the tamperproof modules execute a specific algorithm solving a
variant either of the consensus problem or of the atomic commitment problem.
However, in this particular case, the solvability of fair exchange is conditioned
by the number of Byzantine processes. True fair exchange is only possible if
there is a majority of correct processes.
The role of trust in these two settings – the centralized TTP and the embedded
tamperproof modules – is different in each but nonetheless critical in both in
order to achieve fairness. The aim of this chapter is to provide a model of trust
suiting as many settings as possible, including the two above, and to produce
a general solvability condition in this context.
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2.2 System Model: Adding Trust
Intuitively, our model consists of a synchronous distributed system composed
of two types of process: participants, which are processes potentially subject
to Byzantine failures, and trustees, which are known a priori to be correct (and
which can thus be trusted). Adding only a single trusted process would how-
ever limit the scope of our model and imply a specific role for that trustee, i.e.,
that of a TTP. For this reason, we associate a trustee with each process, hence
uniformly splitting the notion of trust among participants of the exchange.
This enlarges the domain of topologies, to range from the TTP approach to
fully decentralized settings.
More formally, as in Section 1.2, we consider a distributed system consisting of
a set Π of n processes, Π = {p1, . . . , pn}, and complete our model with a set Π′
of n trusted processes, Π′ = {p′1, . . . , p′n}, i.e., known a priori to be correct by
all other processes. To distinguish them, processes of Π are called participants
and processes of Π′ trustees. Moreover, each participant pi is matched in a one-
to-one relationship with at least its corresponding trustee p′i. The set Π
+ is
then the set of all 2n participants and trustees, i.e., Π+ = Π∪Π′. Participants
are processes actually taking part in the exchange by offering and demanding
items, and they may exhibit Byzantine behaviors. Trustees on the contrary
are trusted processes that have no direct interest in the exchange. Their role
is to decide when it is appropriate to provide their associated participant with
its expected item.
We also assume the existence of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which pro-
vides sign and encrypt primitives along with the corresponding signature veri-
fication and decipher primitives. However, the signature verification primitive
is not used explicitly, since this is done inside functions that verify the validity
of messages. Each process (participants and trustees) thus owns a private key
and has made the corresponding public key accessible to all other processes.
Among other things, this assumption provides message unforgeability.
2.2.1 Topology and Synchrony.
Processes of Π+ form a connected communication network and communicate
by message passing. The system is synchronous : it exhibits synchronous com-
putation and synchronous communication, i.e., there exist upper bounds on
processing and communication delays, and these are known.1 Links are reli-
able bidirectional communication channels, i.e., perfect links (PL). They pro-
vide send and deliver primitives (respectively PL.send() and PL.deliver()) and
1If delays exist but are unknown, they can be found through the use of adaptive timeouts.
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ensure the reliable delivery, no duplication and no creation properties described
in Section 1.2. The synchronous system assumption implies that the delivery
will occur within some known time bound ∆PL.
Regarding the network topology, we assume that processes of Π+ form a con-
nected graph and that there exists a direct link between any participant and its
trustee. The notion of trustee allows us to produce a generic model applicable
to various trust and network topologies. In particular, this model does not
dictate the role of trustees in the fair exchange protocol, i.e., the amount of
computation trustees bear or how they are connected to one another, except
for the fact that each trustee is connected to its corresponding process.
(a) TTP-based topology. (b) Guardian angels topology.
Participant
Trustee
TTP
Figure 2.2: Examples of valid topologies as defined in our model.
As a consequence, most existing solutions, either centralized or decentralized,
can be described in our model. Simpler topologies, using fewer trustees, can
easily be transformed to fit our model. Indeed, any trustee matched with sev-
eral participants can be represented by a cluster of as many trustees, fully
interconnected, with each trustee of this cluster matched with a single partic-
ipant. For example in Figure 2.2(a), the classical centralized TTP setting, as
in [ASW00], is transformed into a cluster of n fully interconnected trustees.
Figure 2.2(b) illustrates a distributed trust setting, as with Guardian An-
gels [AGGV05].
2.2.2 Executions and Failure Patterns
The definitions of execution and failure given hereafter are the same as those
introduced in Section 1.2. However, failures refer exclusively to participants,
i.e., processes of Π, since trustees are correct by definition. In each step of an
execution of an algorithm A, a process may thus (1) send a message, (2) receive
a message and (3) update its local state. A Byzantine process is one that
deviates from A in any way. A Byzantine failure pattern f is then defined as
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a function from T to 2Π where f(t) denotes a set of Byzantine participants
that have deviated from A through time t. A failure pattern f can thus be
seen as a projection of all process failures during some execution of A. Once a
process starts misbehaving, it cannot subsequently be considered correct, i.e.,
f(t) ⊆ f(t+ 1).
Let Byz(f) =
⋃
t∈T f(t) and Cor(f) = Π − Byz(f) denote respectively the set
of all Byzantine processes and the set of all correct processes in an execution
with failure pattern f . We then define the set Fb of all failure patterns where
no more than b processes are Byzantine. More formally, since n is the number
of processes in Π, Fb is the largest subset of F such that, for any failure pattern
f in Fb, |Byz(f)| ≤ b, with 0 ≤ b ≤ n. That is, we have:
Fb = {f ∈ F : |Byz(f)| ≤ b} with 0 ≤ b ≤ n .
From this definition, b is the maximum number of Byzantine processes in any
failure pattern of Fb and Fn = F . Finally, we define the set F
∼
f of all failure
patterns producing the same set of Byzantine processes as f . More formally,
given some failure pattern f , F∼f is the largest subset of F such that, for any
failure pattern f ′ in F∼f , Byz(f
′) = Byz(f). That is, we have:
F∼f = {f ′ ∈ F : Byz(f ′) = Byz(f)} .
2.3 Solvability in the Model with Trust
Two opposite settings both provide solutions to the problem of fair exchange
and can be described using our new model, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In
TRUST LEVEL?
CONDITIONNALLY
POSSIBLE
UNCONDITIONNALLY
POSSIBLE
Figure 2.3: How much trust is needed for solving fair exchange?
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one, the centralized TTP approach allows for solution to the fair exchange
problem regardless of the number of Byzantine processes. In the other, the
guardian angels approach also solves fair exchange but requires a majority of
correct participants. Interestingly, this honest majority assumption is related
to trust. So we have to address the question of the connection between these
two approaches. In other words, can we express some general condition on the
level of trust needed to solve the problem of fair exchange?
2.3.1 The Reachable Majority (RM) Condition
Intuitively, the reachable majority (RM) condition ensures that any correct
participant process is reliably connected to a strict majority of trustees. To
define the RM condition formally, we first define the notion of reliable path.
Let pi and pj be two correct processes of Π
+. For any failure pattern f , we
say that pi and pj are connected by a reliable path if there exists at least
one path between pi and pj such that no process along that path is in Byz(f).
(a) b ≤ n− 1 (b) b ≤ dn2 − 1e
(c) b ≤ n2
Correct process
Byzantine process
Trustee
Figure 2.4: Topologies under the RM condition.
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Furthermore, given a process pi ∈ Π (participants) and a failure pattern f ∈ F ,
we define Cfpi as the largest subset of Π
′ (trustees) such that any trustee p′j
of Cfpi is connected to pi by a reliable path. The RM condition is then formally
defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Reachable Majority Condition). Topological condition under
which, for any correct process pi ∈ Π, for any failure pattern f ∈ Fb and even
in the presence of up to b Byzantine processes, |Cfpi| > n2 .
We then define the notions of major and minor trustees. Intuitively, in a
given execution, a trustee is said to be major if it is connected to all correct
processes by a reliable path. Otherwise, it is said to be minor.
Definition 3 (Major Trustee). Given a failure pattern f , a trustee p′j is a
major trustee if p′j ∈ Cfpi, for any correct process pi ∈ Π.
The strict majority of Definition 2 ensures not only that in any given execution
there are indeed some major trustees but also that there is a majority of them.
Also note that if the RM condition is met, it implies that all correct processes
and the majority of trustees are interconnected by reliable paths. However, it
is important to understand that it neither implies nor requires a majority of
correct processes.
Given a specific topology, the RM condition puts a constraint on the maximum
number b of Byzantine processes. Figure 2.4 gives examples of topologies
under the RM condition, with their resultant upper bounds on the number of
Byzantine processes. As illustrated in Figure 2.4(a), a TTP allows any number
of Byzantine processes, whereas Figure 2.4(b) and 2.4(c) show topologies only
allowing, respectively, a minority and up to a half of processes to be Byzantine.
2.3.2 Impossibility Result
In Section 1.4, it was shown that fair exchange is impossible without at least
one trusted process. On the other hand, a cluster of trustees acting as a TTP
yields a solution. However, depending on the network topology, the presence
of trustees is not sufficient. In the context of the model with trustees the
reachable majority condition is necessary in order to solve fair exchange. This
is the subject of Theorem 2 below, which relies on Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. In any topology, if there exists an algorithm A solving fair exchange
with up to b Byzantine processes, then for any failure pattern f ∈ Fb, there
exists an execution associated with a failure pattern f ′ ∈ F∼f such that every
process in Cor(f ′) releases its expected item.
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Proof. Consider an execution E of A in which all processes are correct. From
the non-triviality, termination and validity properties, in E every process even-
tually releases its correct item. Now consider any failure pattern f ∈ Fb. From
E, we derive an execution E ′ associated with a failure pattern f ′ ∈ F∼f , i.e.,
Byz(f ′) = Byz(f), such that, in E ′, every process of Byz(f ′) deviates from A
just before releasing its item, e.g., by crashing. Since E ′ is indistinguishable
from E for all correct processes, every process in Cor(f ′) releases its correct
item.
Theorem 2. In the context of a synchronous model with trustees and Byzan-
tine failures, there is no deterministic solution to the fair exchange problem,
if the reachable majority condition is not satisfied, even in the presence of a
single Byzantine process, i.e., b = 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some algorithm A solves fair exchange and that the reachable
majority condition is not satisfied, i.e., there is some correct process pi ∈ Π
and some failure pattern f ∈ Fb for which |Cfpi| ≤ n2 , even for b = 1. From
Lemma 1, we know that there exists an execution E ′ associated with a failure
pattern f ′ ∈ F∼f , such that every process in Cor(f ′) releases its expected item.
Hence, in E ′, pi receives its expected item, e.g., mj, from its trustee p′i. We now
have to consider two cases: (a) the transmission of mj from p
′
i to pi depends
on the reception by p′i of some message x sent by some trustee p
′
j ∈ Π′ − Cfpi ,
and (b) the transmission of mj from p
′
i to pi is independent of the reception
by p′i of any message sent by any trustee p
′
j ∈ Π′ − Cfpi .2
Case (a). From E ′, we can derive an execution E ′′, where message x is blocked
by some Byzantine process along the unreliable path between p′i and p
′
j,
as well as any following messages. Since E ′′ is indistinguishable from E ′
for any process unreliably connected to p′i, i.e., processes associated with
trustees of Π′ − Cfpi , these processes release their expected item in E ′′.
However, in E ′′, p′i never receives x. Since the transmission ofmj depends
on the reception of x, p′i never sends mj to pi. To satisfy the validity and
termination properties, pi releases ϕ but thus violates fairness. This
leaves us with case (b).
Case (b). From E ′, we can derive an execution E ′′′, in which some Byzantine
process pk fails to send the expected item to some trustee p
′
j ∈ Π′ −Cfpi ,
with pj correct and (pk, pj) ∈ Ω. Since the transmission of mj from
p′i to pi is independent of the reception of any message sent by any
trustee of Π′−Cfpi (including p′j), for p′i and pi, executions E ′′′ and E ′ are
2By definition, Cfpi = C
f ′
pi , for any failure f and f
′ such that f ′ ∈ F∼f .
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indistinguishable. Thus, in E ′′′, pi releases its expected item. However,
since p′j never receives the expected item of pk, neither does pj. To satisfy
the validity and termination properties, pj eventually releases ϕ but thus
violates fairness. Therefore, algorithm A does not solve fair exchange.
A contradiction.
2.3.3 Solvability Result
We have shown that the RM condition is necessary in order to solve the prob-
lem of fair exchange deterministically in the model with trustees. Theorem 3
below shows that it is also sufficient. This result allows us to apprehend
precisely the solvability of the fair exchange problem for various topologies,
possibly any topology. Indeed, given a topology and a number of Byzantine
processes, one can infer whether a solution exists in that context. Perhaps
more interestingly, it is possible to determine the maximum number of Byzan-
tine processes that a specific network topology may sustain while still allowing
true fair exchange, as opposed to probabilistic fair exchange, in which fairness
is only ensured with a certain probability.
Theorem 3 (Solvability). In the context of a synchronous model with trustees
and Byzantine failures, there exists a deterministic solution to the fair exchange
problem under the reachable majority condition.
Proof. In Section 2.4, we present Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 (on pages 35 and 36),
which combine to produce a generic solution to fair exchange, for any topology
and any number of Byzantine processes satisfying the RM condition. Theo-
rem 3 is then proven by showing that this solution preserves the validity,
uniqueness, non-triviality, termination, integrity and fairness properties of
fair exchange.
2.4 Fair Exchange under the RM Condition
As described in Section 2.2 (system model), participants communicate by mes-
sage passing and the network is a connected graph with respective participants
and trustees connected directly. Algorithm 2.1, executed by correct partici-
pants, and Algorithm 2.2, executed by trustees, combine to compose our mod-
ular solution. As shown in Figure 2.5, the algorithms rely on three commu-
nication modules: a best-effort multicast module and a Byzantine agreement
module described hereafter, and perfect links, as introduced in Section 1.2.
Note that we merely aim at proving that a general solution does exist under
the RM condition and are therefore not concerned with performance.
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Fair Exchange (1)
Best-effort
Multicast
Perfect link
(a) Modules of a participant.
Fair Exchange (2)
Best-effort
Multicast
Perfect link
Byzantine
Agreement
(b) Modules of a trustee.
Figure 2.5: Layered diagrams of the modules involved in our solution.
2.4.1 Best-effort Multicast
In order to solve fair exchange, Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 rely on a best-effort
multicast (BM) module that provides processes (participants and trustees)
with the means to send messages to any group of processes with best effort.
As described in our extended model, processes that are directly connected
can communicate via reliable channels. However, two processes that do not
benefit from a direct link are not necessarily connected reliably, since paths
between them might go through a Byzantine process, making communications
unreliable. The BM module provides a means of sending messages reliably to
processes reachable through at least one reliable path.3 The module provides
two primitives, send and deliver, described hereafter.
BM.send(pi, S, ‘type’,m) – Enables a process pi to multicast a message m
to a defined set S of processes. The message type prevents confusion
between different messages.
BM.deliver(pi, pj, ‘type’,m) – Works as a callback and enables a process pj
of S to receive a message m from process pi.
The best-effort multicast ensures the following set of properties.
No duplication. No message is delivered by a process more than once.
No creation. If a message m is delivered by some process pj, then m was
previously sent by some process pi.
Termination. Let pi and pj be two correct processes connected by a reliable
path. If pi BM.sends a message m to a set S, with pj ∈ S, then pj
eventually delivers m.
3This can be achieved using flooding as presented in Section 2.4.6 or some more sophis-
ticated algorithm [DFS05].
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Agreement. Let pi and pj be two correct processes of any set S that are
connected by a reliable path. If pi BM.delivers a message m BM.sent to
S, then pj BM.delivers m.
The termination property of BM is achieved within some maximum time bound
∆BM, e.g., by having in the worst case ∆BM = n × ∆PL, with ∆PL being the
delay of perfect links.
2.4.2 Byzantine Agreement
Algorithm 2.2 also relies on a Byzantine agreement (BA) module, which pro-
vides trustees with the means to reach agreement among major trustees, in
spite of Byzantine failures that may occur along the various paths. The mod-
ule is a particular application of the Byzantine agreement solution presented
in [LSP82]. Section 2.4.7 discusses how this solution can be applied to our
model with participants and trustees organized according to the topology of
Figure 2.2(b). The BA module provides three primitives, BA.start(), BA.send()
and BA.deliver().
BA.start(p′j) – Enables a trustee p
′
i to start an execution of BA in order to
receive a message from a trustee p′j. For each execution of the protocol,
every trustee calls the start primitive at the same time (see discussion
about the timing assumptions below) and trustee p′j calls the send prim-
itive.
BA.send(p′i,m) – Enables a trustee p
′
i to broadcast a message m reliably to
all trustees.
BA.deliver(p′i,M) – Works as a callback and enables a trustee p
′
j to receive
a set M of messages as the result of a reliable broadcast by trustee p′i.
Possible outcomes of the broadcast are twofold: (1) M is a singleton,
meaning that transmissions from the sender were not blocked, so the
message can be used; (2) M is the empty set, meaning that the sender
did not call the send primitive in a timely fashion or that the messages
from the sender were blocked.
The goal is to prevent Byzantine processes from threatening agreement among
correct processes and to ensure the following interactive consistency (IC) prop-
erties.
IC1 – Agreement. If a major trustee BA.delivers a set of messages M , then
every major trustee BA.delivers M .
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IC2 – Validity. If a major trustee BA.sends a message m, then every major
trustee eventually BA.delivers the set {m}.
When relying on unforgeable signed messages, a solution is known to exist for
any number of Byzantine processes [LSP82]. However, while we indeed assume
unforgeable signed messages, in our case, the number of Byzantine processes is
still restricted by the reachable majority condition. It is nonetheless interesting
to note that the use of such a Byzantine agreement module does not further
restrict that number.
Timing Assumption. An implicit assumption in [LSP82] is that all trustees
start at roughly the same time to allow the absence of messages to be detected.
Since we assume that trustees start Algorithm 2.2 roughly at the same time,
the start primitive enables us to ensure explicitly that missing messages are
detected by having all trustees call the start primitive at the same time. This
ensures the termination of BA, even if a trustee does not send any vote or if
messages are blocked by some Byzantine processes. Also, in a synchronous
model, an essential requirement of Byzantine agreement is that the delivery of
a set of messages is achievable within a maximum time bound. Furthermore,
in [DS83] it is shown that deterministic Byzantine agreement protocols with
authentication have a lower bound b+ 1 on the number of rounds, with b the
number of Byzantine processes. Thus, if we choose such an implementation of
BA, this time bound can be computed as a function of ∆BM, the latency of BM,
and b, the number of Byzantine processes, and hence ∆BA = (b+ 1)×∆BM.
In [FM88, KK06], solutions to the Byzantine agreement problem allow ex-
pected time bounds that are constant, i.e., not correlated with the number
of Byzantine processes, with the assumption of an honest majority. However,
while the honest majority assumption suits our needs, these solutions do not
achieve deterministic Byzantine agreement and are thus not usable for ensuring
true fairness.
2.4.3 A General Algorithm of Fair Exchange
Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 provide a general solution to the fair exchange problem
for any topology and any number of Byzantine processes meeting the RM con-
dition. We assume that all correct processes – including all trustees – have
local clocks that are synchronized within some fixed maximum error, as dis-
cussed in [PSL80], so they are able to start the algorithms roughly at the
same time. We also assume that the upon actions (found in both algorithms)
are executed atomically with respect to one another. Participants execute Al-
gorithm 2.1, which initiates the fair exchange protocol, and trustees execute
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Algorithm 2.2. In Algorithm 2.1, each participant sends an encrypted version
of its offered item to the trustee of the corresponding participant, according to
Ω (the terms of the exchange). It then waits to receive and release the content
of the first message sent by its trustee. The termination of Algorithm 2.1 is
ensured by the timeout contained in Algorithm 2.2. In Algorithm 2.2, each
trustee waits to receive the item expected by its associated participant. Algo-
rithm 2.2 is then structured in two phases: (1) voting, and (2) clue exchange.
Algorithm 2.1 Fair exchange – Protocol executed by participant pi
1: Uses: Perfect Link (PL), Best-effort Multicast (BM)
2: Initialisation:
3: released← false
4: function offer(item, pj)
5: BM.send(pi, {p′j}, ‘item’, encrypt(p′j , item)) {send encrypted item to p′j}
6: upon PL.deliver(p′i, pi, item) do {PL callback}
7: if ¬released then {check if not released}
8: released← true {set released to true}
9: release(item) {release the item received}
Voting phase. In this phase, trustee p′i sends its vote to every trustee to
inform them that it holds the expected item, and waits to receive the vote
of every trustee. In Algorithm 2.2, once trustee p′i receives the encrypted
item (line 7), it deciphers it using its private key, checks if it matches its
description and starts the voting phase. The trustee signs and broadcasts its
proceed vote (line 12) using BA, indicating that it holds the expected item.
It also starts BA for each trustee to ensure termination of all executions of
BA. Then, upon reception of a vote, the validProceedVote() function checks
if the delivered set is a singleton containing the proceed vote of the sender
(line 17). If the vote is valid, it is added to the set of votes. Once all votes are
gathered, a trustee knows that every trustee voted proceed and that they
thus hold the expected item. With that information, trustee p′i enters the final
phase by signing and then sending the n votes – called the i-th clue – to every
trustee (line 21).
Clue exchange phase. In this phase, trustee p′i sends its clue to all trustees
to inform them that it received all n votes, and waits to receive the clues from
a majority of trustees (line 27).4 Upon reception of a clue, the validClue()
4In certain topologies, this condition could be smaller, i.e., less than the majority. How-
ever, since we are merely providing a general solution and not trying to achieve efficiency,
this condition is used because it is strong enough for all cases.
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Algorithm 2.2 Fair exchange – Protocol executed by trustee p′i
1: Uses: Perfect Link (PL), Best-effort Multicast (BM), Byzantine Agreement (BA)
2: Initialisation:
3: t0 ← time() {set t0 to starting time}
4: di ← ... {set description to known value}
5: item← ⊥ {set variable to null}
6: votes, clues← ∅ {set variables to empty set}
7: upon BM.deliver(pj , p′i, ‘item’, sealedItem) do {BM callback}
8: if (item = ⊥) then {check for duplicate send}
9: item← decipher(sealedItem) {decipher and store received item}
10: if desc(item) = di then {check if item matches description}
11: vote← sign(‘proceed’) {produce proceed vote}
12: BA.send(p′i, vote) {send vote}
13: upon time() > t0 +∆BM do {item exchange phase is over}
14: for all p′j ∈ Π′ do {for all trustees}
15: BA.start(p′j) {start BA}
16: upon BA.deliver(p′j , vote) do {BA callback}
17: if validProceedVote(vote) then {check vote}
18: votes← votes ∪ vote {add p′j’s vote to set}
19: if (|votes| = n) then {if all votes are proceed}
20: clue← sign(votes) {produce clue}
21: BM.send(p′i,Π
′, ‘clue’, clue) {send clue}
22: else
23: PL.send(p′i, pi, ϕ) {send ϕ to pi}
24: upon BM.deliver(p′j , p
′
i, ‘clue’, clue) do {BM callback}
25: if validClue(clue) then {check if message is valid}
26: clues← clues ∪ {clue} {add pj’s clue to set}
27: if (|clues| > n/2) then {check for majority of clues}
28: PL.send(p′i, pi, item) {send item to pi}
function checks if the clue contains a signed set of all n proceed votes (line 25).
With bn
2
+1c clues, it sends the deciphered item to its corresponding participant
(line 28). The majority is necessary to ensure that at least one major trustee
was able to produce its i-th clue in order for any process to release its item. At
this stage, no Byzantine process is able to prevent trustees of correct processes
from sending the expected item to their respective participant processes.
2.4.4 Examples of Executions
Figure 2.6 presents three possible executions of Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 with
three processes and up to one Byzantine process. In all figures, the top line
shows the time line, the top labels corresponds to the correct behavior, the
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(a) All three processes are correct.
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(b) Process p3 does not send its item.
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(c) Process p3 blocks the messages from its trustee.
Figure 2.6: Examples of executions of Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2.
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arrows show the message transmissions and the bottom labels (if any) give the
Byzantine behavior of process p3.
Figure 2.6(a) shows an execution in which all processes are correct and they
thus receive the expected item after the clue exchange phase. In Figure 2.6(b),
process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior by failing to
send the item expected by p′1. Thus p
′
1 does not send its vote and eventually
every correct process releases the abort item after the voting phase. However
process p3 is not able to release its item. In Figure 2.6(c), process p3 is Byzan-
tine and deviates from the correct behavior by blocking messages sent by its
trustee p′3 in the third phase, i.e., p
′
3 cannot transmit its clues. However, in
this case, all the correct processes are still able to release their items since they
still receive a majority of clues.
2.4.5 Correctness Proof
In the following, we prove that Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 solve fair exchange
under the reachable majority condition by ensuring the validity, uniqueness,
non-triviality, termination, integrity and fairness properties of fair exchange.
Based on Lemma 2, the respective theorems hereafter validate each property.
In the following, the term process is only used to designate participants, i.e.,
processes of Π, unless specifically mentioned otherwise.
Lemma 2. If some trustee does not receive the expected encrypted item, then
no trustee sends an item at line 28 of Algorithm 2.2.
Proof. If some trustee does not receive the expected item, it does not send the
proceed vote (line 12). Hence no trustee receives all n proceed votes, so
no trustee sends its i-th clue. From the no creation property of perfect links,
if no trustee sends its i-th clue, then no trustee receives any clue. Without a
majority of clues, no trustee sends the item to its corresponding participant
at line 28 of Algorithm 2.2.
Theorem 4 (Validity). If a correct process pi releases an item x, then either
x ∈M and x matches di, or x is the abort item ϕ.
Proof. In Algorithm 2.1, a process pi only releases an item at line 9. Process
pi releases upon reception of an item from its trustee p
′
i, so the possible items
are those sent by p′i in Algorithm 2.2. In Algorithm 2.2, trustee p
′
i explicitly
sends the abort item ϕ at line 23 so pi would release ϕ. The only other case
of item transmission is at line 28: p′i sends the item that is stored in variable
item. From Lemma 2, if a trustee sends an item at line 28, it has previously
received the expected item and stored it in variable item. Since, from line 8,
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no two different items can be stored in variable item, p′i sends the expected
item at line 28. Thus pi would release the expected item.
Theorem 5 (Uniqueness). No correct process releases more than once.
Proof. The boolean variable released in Algorithm 2.1 and the atomic execution
of upon statements prevent any correct process from releasing more than once.
Theorem 6 (Non-triviality). If all processes are correct, no process releases
the abort item ϕ.
Proof. Since all processes are correct, each process sends the correct encrypted
item at line 5 of Algorithm 2.1, as agreed in the terms of the exchange. From
the validity property of BM, every trustee p′i receives an item matching de-
scription di before time t1 = t0+∆BM, so every trustee produces and sends its
proceed vote at line 12 of Algorithm 2.2 in a timely fashion. From the IC2
property of BA, no process receives an invalid proceed vote. Therefore, no
trustee sends the abort item ϕ (line 23) of Algorithm 2.2 and thus no process
releases ϕ.
Theorem 7 (Termination). Every correct process eventually releases an item.
Proof. The assumption that participants and trustees start Algorithms 2.1
and 2.2 at the same time and the timeout at line 13 of Algorithm 2.2 ensures
that every trustee starts all n executions of BA at the same time. This implies
that, from the existence of a time bound for the termination of BA and the
IC1 property, there is a time after which either (a) every trustee of correct pro-
cesses receives at least one invalid proceed vote and sends the abort item ϕ,
prompting the corresponding correct process to release ϕ, or (b) every major
trustee receives all n valid proceed votes. In the latter case, every major
trustee produces and sends its i-th clue at line 21 of Algorithm 2.2. From the
validity property of BM and the reachable majority condition, every trustee
of correct processes receives a majority of clues and then sends the item at
line 28 of Algorithm 2.2. Thus, from the reliable delivery property of perfect
links, every correct process releases the item.
Theorem 8 (Integrity). No process pj releases an item mi, with process pi
correct, if mi matches description dk of some correct process pk, with pk 6= pj.
Proof. Since any process pk and its trustee p
′
k are directly connected, no process
pj intercepts the transmission of any deciphered item mi by p
′
k at line 28 of
Algorithm 2.2. Only in a single step of Algorithm 2.1, i.e., at line 5, does
a correct process pi transmit its item mi through the network. Since pi is
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correct, pi encrypts mi using the public key of p
′
k in order to send it through
the network. Thus no process other than pi and pk holds a deciphered version
of mi and, since both are correct, they do not send a deciphered version of mi
to pj. From the PKI unforgeability assumption, pj is not capable of obtaining
a deciphered version of mi and therefore does not release mi.
Theorem 9 (Fairness). If any process pi releases an item mj matching de-
scription di, with pi or pj correct, then every correct process pk releases an
item matching its description dk.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some correct process pk does not release an item matching de-
scription dk and that some other process pi releases an item mj matching
description di, with pi or pj correct. If pi releases mj (line 9 of Algorithm 2.1),
either pi is correct and only releases an item received from its trustee p
′
i; or pj
is correct and encrypted mj before sending it to p
′
i (line 5 of Algorithm 2.1)
and thus pi is only capable of releasing mj by receiving it from its trustee p
′
i.
In either case, if pi releases mj, mj is received from trustee p
′
i, which sends mj
at line 28 of Algorithm 2.2. For this to happen, p′i must have received a ma-
jority of clues in some previous steps. From the reachable majority condition,
at least one of these clues is produced by some major trustee p′x. Trustee p
′
x
therefore received all n proceed votes. Thus, from the IC1 property of BA,
every major trustee also receives all n proceed votes, including all trustees of
correct processes. This implies that no trustee of correct processes sends the
abort item ϕ (line 23 of Algorithm 2.2), including p′k, so pk does not release ϕ.
From the validity and termination properties of FE, if pk does not release ϕ,
then pk releases an item matching description dk. A contradiction.
2.4.6 Best-effort Multicast: Solution and Proof
Algorithm 2.3 provides a solution to the best-effort multicast abstraction pre-
sented in Section 2.4.1 and therefore shows that the BM module is imple-
mentable in the context of our model. We assume that every process knows
its direct neighbors and we define Vpi as the set of neighbors of process pi.
Intuitively, Algorithm 2.3 satisfies the properties of best-effort multicast by
having correct processes flood the network with multicasted messages. Flood-
ing is achieved by forwarding any received message the first time it is received.
Upon reception of a message, if the process is included in the set S of recipi-
ents, it also delivers the message. Note that, while flooding the network allows
Byzantine processes the possibility of delivering messages illegitimately, it does
not jeopardize the validity property of BM. Moreover, in our specific use of
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Algorithm 2.3 Best-effort multicast protocol executed by process pi
1: Uses:
2: Perfect Link (PL)
3: Initialisation:
4: forwarded← ∅ {set of forwarded messages}
5: function send(pi, S,m)
6: for all pj ∈ Vpi do {for all neighbors}
7: PL.send(pi, pj , 〈pi, S, signi(m)〉) {sign and send the message}
8: if pi ∈ S then {check if message destined to self}
9: deliver(m) {deliver the message}
10: upon PL.deliver(pj , pi, 〈pk, S, signk(m)〉) do
11: if m /∈ forwarded then {check if not forwarded}
12: forwarded← forwarded ∪ {m} {add the message to forwarded set}
13: for all px ∈ Vpi − {pj} do {for all neighbors except pj}
14: PL.send(pi, px, 〈pk, S, signk(m)〉) {forward the message}
15: if pi ∈ S then {check if message destined to self}
16: deliver(m) {deliver the message}
BM, this possibility of stealing messages has no impact on the outcomes of our
fair exchange protocol.
Note that, in line 10 of Algorithm 2.3, the notation signk(m) in the upon action
implies that the code is only executed if the message m is correctly signed by
its originator pk. In other words, it implies that the signature performed at
line 7 is verified upon delivery of messages at line 10.
Correctness Proof
Our correctness proof, based on Lemma 3, shows that Algorithm 2.3 preserves
the agreement and termination properties of best-effort multicast. It also
indirectly shows that BM is implementable in our model.
Lemma 3. Let pi and pj be any two correct processes that are connected by a
reliable path. If pi receives a message m, then pj receives m.
5
Proof. The proof is by induction.
Basis step. Assume that some correct process pi receives a message m (line 5
or 10) and that pi and pj are directly connected. Either (a) pi is the originator
of m and sends m to processes of Vpi or (b) pi receives m from some process px
5Note that in Lemma 3 the term ‘receive a message’ does not imply that the message is
delivered but only that it is obtained either from the send() function (line 5 of Algorithm 2.3)
or from the PL.deliver() callback (line 10 of Algorithm 2.3).
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and sends m to processes of Vpi−{px}. In both cases, from the reliable delivery
property of perfect links, all processes of Vpi eventually receive m. From our
initial assumption that pj ∈ Vpi , pj receives m.
Inductive step. Assume that any two correct processes pi and pj are con-
nected by a reliable path. From definition of reliable paths, there exists a
process pk such that pk is on that reliable path and pj ∈ Vpk . Moreover, pk
is correct and connected to pi through a reliable path. Now – inductive hy-
pothesis – assume that pi and pk receive a message m. Thus, either (a) pk is
the originator of m and sends m to processes of Vpk or (b) pk receives m from
some process py and sends m to processes of Vpk − {py}. In both cases, from
the reliable delivery property of perfect links, all processes of Vpk eventually
receive m. From our initial assumption that pj ∈ Vpk , pj receives m.
Theorem 10 (Termination). Let pi and pj be two correct processes connected
by a reliable path. If pi sends a message m to a set S, with pj ∈ S, then pj
eventually delivers m.
Proof. Assume that two correct processes pi and pj are connected by a reliable
path and that pi sends a message m to a set S, with pj ∈ S. Thus pi receives
m, as the originator of m. From Lemma 3, pj also receives m. Since pj is a
correct process of S, either m is in the forwarded set of pj and pj has delivered
m, or m is not in the forwarded set of pj and pj delivers m at line 16.
Theorem 11 (Agreement). Let pi and pj be two correct processes of any set
S that are connected by a reliable path. If pi delivers a message m sent to S,
then pj delivers m.
Proof. Assume that two correct processes pi and pj of S are connected by
a reliable path and that pi delivers a message m. Thus pi receives m in a
previous step of Algorithm 2.3 (line 5 or 10). From Lemma 3, pj also receives
m. Since pj is a correct process of S, either m is in the forwarded set of pj and
pj has delivered m, or m is not in the forwarded set of pj and pj delivers m at
line 16.
2.4.7 Implementation of BA in our Model
In [LSP82], the model is that of a fully connected distributed system, assuming
reliable connections and Byzantine failures. The Byzantine agreement protocol
is thus executed by a set of processes, some of which may exhibit Byzantine
behaviors. In Section 2.4.2, we propose to apply this same protocol to our
extended model, i.e., with processes and trustees. However, the network is not
necessarily fully connected. In our case, the Byzantine agreement is executed
2.4. Fair Exchange under the RM Condition 43
by the trustees, which by definition are all correct but not necessarily connected
reliably. In spite of these differences, we claim that the problem and solution
of [LSP82] can easily be adapted to our model.
While communications along unreliable paths may be blocked by Byzantine
processes, major trustees are connected reliably by definition, since they have
at least one path connecting each other that does not go through a Byzan-
tine process. Figure 2.7 illustrates, in a simple example, the transformation
required in order to adapt our context to that of Byzantine agreement. Since
assumptions in [LSP82] require reliable connections, we first adapt our context
by considering that minor trustees are responsible for Byzantine failures hap-
pening along the unreliable paths leading to them. Thus our minor trustees
correspond to the Byzantine processes of [LSP82] and our unreliable paths
can now be considered reliable. Recall that, in our case, agreement only needs
(a) Step 1: A possible setting for
Algorithm 2.2, with unreliable paths
shown as dotted lines.
(b) Step 2: Conveying the respon-
sibility of Byzantine behaviors onto
minor trustees.
(c) Step 3: The resulting set-
ting matching the original model
of [LSP82]
Correct process
Byzantine process
Trustee
Major trustee: “correct”
Minor trustee: “Byzantine”
Figure 2.7: Three steps for adapting our context to the original setting of
Byzantine agreement.
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to be reached among major trustees, regardless of minor trustees, just as cor-
rect processes reach agreement in [LSP82] in spite of Byzantine processes.
To summarize, Byzantine agreement can thus be applied to our context by
considering major trustees as correct processes, minor trustees as Byzantine
processes, and unreliable paths as reliable.
2.5 Revisiting Existing Solutions
In the light of our model with trustees, we propose to revisit two existing
solutions presented in the introduction to this chapter to see how they are
affected by the reachable majority condition.
2.5.1 The Trusted Third Party
Several algorithms described in the literature rely on the TTP paradigm. The
simplest TTP-based algorithm consists in having processes send their items
to a centralized trustee, the TTP. The TTP verifies that the terms of the
exchange are respected and, if this is the case, forwards the items. These
TTP-based solutions naturally fit our model with trustees. Our model uses n
trustees instead of only one in TTP-based solutions. Mapping the TTP model
to ours is done by considering all n trustees jointly as a fully connected cluster
playing the role of the TTP. The network topology of this solution is such
that each process is directly connected to one distinct trustee of the cluster, as
illustrated in Figure 2.8. It is then fairly obvious to see that the TTP topology
is so secure that the reachable majority condition is satisfied for any number
of Byzantine processes.
Correct process
Byzantine process
Trustee
Figure 2.8: The TTP topology allows any number of Byzantine processes.
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2.5.2 The Guardian Angels
In [AGGV05, AV03], guardian angels are defined as tamperproof security de-
vices that are considered correct. Processes are fully interconnected by a com-
munication network with bidirectional reliable channels. There are n guardian
angels but each of them is only connected to one process. In other words,
each process can directly communicate with its assigned security device but
needs to go through some untrusted process to communicate with other secu-
rity devices. Intuitively, in order to solve fair exchange, each item is encrypted
and sent to the security device of the corresponding process, i.e., the process
expecting the item. Security devices then enter a synchronization protocol,
which upon success enables the devices to send the items to the processes.
The assumption is made that the security devices are able to check the valid-
ity of the items and to encrypt messages. In a model with no upper bound
on the number of Byzantine processes, the solution given solves fair exchange
with a certain probability. The authors of [AGGV05, AV03] also show that,
even in a synchronous model with security devices, no deterministic algorithm
solves fair exchange without an honest majority, i.e., without b < n
2
.
Correct process
Byzantine process
Trustee
Figure 2.9: The Guardian Angels topology requires an honest majority.
The guardian angels approach fits our extended model if each of the n trustees
represents one distinct security device. Theorem 2 tells us that if any process
p is not connected through a trusted path to a majority of trustees, there is no
solution to the problem. Accordingly, since each trustee is behind a distinct
process, which is potentially Byzantine, there must be a majority of correct
processes, as shown in Figure 2.9. From Theorems 2 and 3, we can then say
that the guardian angels approach deterministically solves fair exchange if and
only if there is a majority of correct processes. As one would expect, this
result concurs with that found in [AGGV05]. Nonetheless, by introducing
dummy messages within their fair exchange protocol executed by the guardian
angels, an interesting feature of their solution lies in its ability to degrade its
quality of service gracefully from deterministic to probabilistic fairness. While
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the probability of violating fairness has an inversely proportional impact on
the average complexity of the algorithm, it ensures that the probability of
unfairness can be made arbitrarily low.
♦♦♦
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Part II
Solution & Implementation
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Chapter 3
A Modular Solution
If a problem has a solution,
there is no need to worry.
If a problem has no solution,
worrying will not help.
Tibetan Proverb
Abstract. This chapter proposes to focus on a specific network topology in order
to provide a fully decentralized, yet realistic, solution to fair exchange. The aim is
thus to optimize the general solution presented in the previous chapter by limiting
the role of the trustees as much as possible. Our algorithm is based on three building
blocks: a perfect link module, a secure box module and a module solving the well-
known Byzantine agreement problem. The secure box modules, which play the role
of trustees, are tamperproof but need not communicate directly with each other and
are only required in a limited number of key steps of our algorithm. These features
have the advantage of providing a more realistic decentralized solution in order to
envisage applications in the real world.
3.1 Introduction
As showed in Chapters 1 and 2, solving fair exchange is impossible in the total
absence of trust and remains problematic in most topologies supported in the
model with trustees. The general solution given as a proof of sufficiency of the
reachable majority condition is an important step in the study of the solvability
of fair exchange. However, the generality of its topology assumption and the
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Figure 3.1: Thesis outline.
fact that it relies heavily on the computational power of the trustees does not
allow for envisaging a concrete deployment of a fully decentralized solution.
We propose to address this issue by providing a solution set in the context of a
specific topology of the model with trustees, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Our
solution relies on a set of embedded trusted modules, one per peer participating
in the exchange, each playing the role of a trustee. Note that this setting does
not remove all the complexity of the problem since such embedded trusted
modules must use unreliable channels in order to communicate with each other.
By relying on fully-decentralized tamperproof modules, our approach departs
from the usual TTP-based approach and bears similarities to the guardian
angels approach [AGG+04, AGGV05, AV03], which also assumes embed-
ded tamperproof modules and a similar network topology. If this approach
is similar to ours from the model perspective, it differs in the power given to
the tamperproof modules. In the guardian angels approach, the tamperproof
modules execute a specific algorithm solving either a variant of the consensus
problem or of the atomic commitment problem. Our approach on the contrary
tries to minimize the role of trusted modules to key steps of our algorithm,
which is then executed outside these modules. This minimal approach makes
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it easier to envisage implementations of our secure module in real hardware.
Nonetheless, an interesting feature of the approach proposed in [AGGV05]
is its ability to degrade its quality of service gracefully from deterministic to
probabilistic fairness.
From a practical perspective, a trusted module is typically implemented as a
tamperproof piece of hardware embedded in each peer host, e.g., a specialized
chip or a smart card. In the industry, hardware-based solutions are gaining
momentum, as illustrated by efforts from IBM, with both its PCI 4758 and
PCI-X 4764 cryptographic coprocessors [DLP+01], and from Intel, with its
Trusted Platform Module [Baj02]. Such solutions are expected to become
mainstream, as the urge to go beyond the limits of software-based security
increases, in particular in the realm of digital rights management.
Despite the fact that some of these specialized chips can be quite powerful, our
approach tries to minimize the requirements on the conceptual trusted mod-
ules we consider, in order to facilitate the fulfillment of these requirements by
current and future chips. Indeed, a fair exchange protocol should make mini-
mal assumptions on the underlying hardware in order to support a wide range
of platforms. Another important aim of our approach consists in providing
a modular solution to fair exchange, where each element of the solution can
easily be replaced by an alternative implementation.
3.2 System Model: a Specific Topology
Except for the topological aspects, which are discussed in Section 3.2.1, the
system model is identical to the extended model of the previous chapter. Ac-
cordingly, we consider a distributed system consisting of a set Π of n partic-
ipants, Π = {p1, . . . , pn} and a set Π′ of n trustees, Π′ = {p′1, . . . , p′n}. Each
trustee p′i is matched in a one-to-one relationship with the corresponding par-
ticipant pi. The set Π
+ is then the set of all 2n processes, i.e., Π+ = Π ∪ Π′.
Participants are processes actually taking part in the exchange by offering and
demanding items, and they may exhibit Byzantine behaviors. Trustees on the
contrary are trusted processes that have no direct interest in the exchange.
We also assume the existence of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which
provides sign and encrypt primitives along with the corresponding signature
verification and decipher primitives. However, the last two are hidden inside
functions that respectively verify the validity of messages and enable encrypted
items to be verified and unsealed. Each process (participants and trustees) thus
owns a private key and has made the corresponding public key accessible to
all other processes. Among other things, this assumption provides message
unforgeability.
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3.2.1 Topology and Synchrony.
Processes of Π are fully interconnected by a communication network and com-
municate by message passing. Trustees are embedded in their respective pro-
cesses and communicate by invoking primitives. The system is synchronous : it
exhibits synchronous computation and synchronous communication, i.e., there
exist upper bounds on processing and communication delays. We also assume
the existence of some global real time clock, whose tick range, noted T , is the
set of natural numbers.
Participant
Trustee
Figure 3.2: Topology with five participants and their trustees.
Regarding the network topology, we assume specifically that all processes of
Π are fully interconnected but that trustees are only connected to their re-
spective processes. Figure 3.2 illustrates such a topology with five participant
processes and five trustees. Links are reliable bidirectional communication
channels, i.e., perfect links (PL). They provide send and deliver primitives
(respectively PL.send() and PL.deliver()) and ensure the reliable delivery, no du-
plication and no creation properties described in Section 1.2. The synchronous
system assumption implies that the delivery will occur within some known time
bound ∆PL.
3.2.2 Executions and Failure Patterns
The definitions of execution and failure are as given in Section 1.2. Here,
however, failures refer exclusively to participants, i.e., processes of Π, since
trustees are correct. In each step of the execution of an algorithm A, a process
may thus (1) send a message, (2) receive a message and (3) update its local
state. A Byzantine process is one that deviates from A in any way. A Byzantine
failure pattern f is then defined as a function from T to 2Π where f(t) denotes
a set of Byzantine participants that have deviated from A through time t.
A failure pattern f can thus be seen as a projection of all process failures
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during some execution of A. Once a process starts misbehaving, it cannot
subsequently be considered correct, i.e., f(t) ⊆ f(t+ 1).
3.3 Fair Exchange with Secure Boxes
Our fair exchange protocol relies on three building blocks: a perfect link mod-
ule, a Byzantine agreement module (BA) and a secure box module (SB), the
latter playing the role of the trustee.1 As suggested in Figure 3.3, only the
code of the secure box module is tamperproof, whereas other modules may
exhibit Byzantine behaviors. Compared to the solution of Section 2.4, we see
that, by the limitation of their communication abilities, trustees are reduced
to being simple embedded tamperproof modules. Furthermore, in this solu-
tion, we aim at minimizing the intelligence required from the secure boxes by
moving as much of the computation as possible into the non-tamperproof part
of the process.
Fair Exchange
Byzantine
Agreement
Perfect link
Secure
Box
Figure 3.3: A layered diagram of the modules involved in our solution.
3.3.1 Secure Box
A secure box (SB) module is a simple tamperproof device and corresponds to
the notion of trustee of our specific model. In this model, each trustee is only
connected to its corresponding process, so the SB module must rely completely
on its host in order to communicate with other trustees or processes. For
example, a Byzantine host may isolate its trustee by blocking any incoming
or outgoing information. In our solution, the role of the secure box is reduced
as far as possible, i.e., it is completely passive and does not interact with
the communication layer. A participant communicates with it by directly
invoking primitives. The secure box can be seen as a local service available to
1In the following, both the terms secure box and trustee are used indifferently.
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each participant. Combined with a public key infrastructure (PKI), its role is
merely one of a safe. The SB device offers the following set of primitives.2
SB.isValidItem(mj,di) – Returns a boolean value stating whether the en-
crypted item mj matches description di.
SB.unseal(mj,proof) – Returns the deciphered itemmj, if the proof of fairness,
i.e., a majority of clues issued by other processes, is valid.
3.3.2 Byzantine Agreement
This module provides processes with a means of broadcasting messages reliably,
in spite of Byzantine failures. While similar to the Byzantine agreement (BA)
module introduced in Section 2.4 (page 31), it is used in the classical setting
of [LSP82], i.e., the module is executed by processes of which some may be
Byzantine. The main difference is that a Byzantine General3 may lie by send-
ing contradictory messages, so the set of messages delivered may contain more
than one value. Since the deliver primitive is slightly different from the one
introduced previously, we recall all three primitives provided by the BA mod-
ule.
BA.start(pj) – Enables a process pi to start an execution of BA in order to
receive a message from a process pj. For each execution of the protocol,
every correct process calls the start primitive at the same time, and
process pj then calls the send primitive.
BA.send(pi,m) – Enables a process pi to broadcast a message m reliably to
all processes.
BA.deliver(pj,M) – Works as a callback and enables a process pj to receive a
set S of messages as the result of a reliable broadcast. Possible outcomes
of the broadcast are threefold: (1)M is a singleton, if the sender behaved
correctly; (2) M contains more than one message, if the sender behaved
incorrectly by sending different messages to different processes; (3) M is
the empty set, if the sender did not send anything.
The goal is to prevent Byzantine processes from threatening agreement among
correct processes and ensure the two interactive consistency (IC) properties.
The properties of Byzantine agreement and the timing assumptions are un-
changed from what was presented in the previous chapter (Section 2.4). Also,
2Both primitives use the decipher primitive of PKI.
3The General is the process broadcasting the message.
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when relying on unforgeable signed messages, a solution is known to exist for
any number of Byzantine processes [LSP82]. However, that number is still
restricted by the reachable majority condition.
3.3.3 A Specific Algorithm of Fair Exchange
Algorithm 3.1 presents our solution to the fair exchange problem. We assume
that all correct processes have local clocks that are synchronized within some
fixed maximum drift, as discussed in [PSL80], so they are able to start the
algorithm roughly at the same time. We also assume that upon actions (found
in Algorithm 3.1) are executed atomically with respect to one another. Our
algorithm is divided into three phases: (1) item exchange, (2) voting and
(3) clue exchange.
Item exchange phase. The first phase of the algorithm allows every process
to send the item it is offering. Each process sends its item to one and only one
other process (line 11), as defined in the terms of the exchange. The item has
to be encrypted, since the receiving process must not be able to have direct
access to it. The encryption is thus made using the public key of the secure
module of the receiving process. The secure box acts as a safe so that the
receiving process only has access to the item at the end of the protocol.
Voting phase. In this phase, process pi sends its vote to every process to
inform them that it holds the expected item, and waits to receive the vote of
every process. Once pi receives the encrypted item, it asks its secure module
to assert that the item matches the description (line 15) and starts the voting
phase. The process signs and broadcasts its proceed vote (line 17) using BA,
indicating that it has received the expected item. It also start BA for each
process in order to synchronize with all the other correct processes (line 20).
Then, upon reception of a vote, the validProceedVote() function checks if the
delivered set is a singleton containing the valid proceed vote of the sender
(line 22). If the vote is valid, it is added to the set of votes. Once all votes
are gathered, a process knows that every process has voted proceed and has
thus received the correct item. With that information, process pi signs and
sends the n votes – called the i-th clue – to every process (line 27). This is
necessary in order to enter the final phase, which consists in having processes
exchange their clues. Note that nothing prevents some Byzantine process pk
from producing its vote and its clue without having previously received its
item. However such behavior cannot prejudice any process other than pk.
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Algorithm 3.1 Fair exchange protocol executed by process pi
1: Uses:
2: Perfect Link (PL), Byzantine Agreement (BA), Secure Box (SB)
3: Initialisation:
4: t0 ← time() {set t0 to starting time}
5: di ← ... {set description to known value}
6: released← false {set variable to false}
7: sealedItem← ⊥ {set variable to null}
8: votes, clues← ∅ {set variables to empty set}
9: function offer(mi, pr)
10: item← encrypt(mi, p′r) {encrypt mi using public key of p′r}
11: PL.send(pi, pr, ‘item’, item) {send encrypted item to pr}
12: upon PL.deliver(ps, pi, ‘item’, item) do {PL callback}
13: if (sealedItem = ⊥) then {check for duplicate send}
14: sealedItem← item {store received item}
15: if SB.isValidItem(sealedItem, di) then {ask SB to check item}
16: vote← sign(‘proceed’) {produce proceed vote}
17: BA.send(pi, vote) {send vote}
18: upon time() > t0 +∆PL do {item exchange phase is over}
19: for all pj ∈ Π do {for all processes}
20: BA.start(pj) {start BA}
21: upon BA.deliver(pj , vote) ∧ (¬released) do {BA callback and not released}
22: if validProceedVote(vote) then {check vote}
23: votes← votes ∪ vote {add pj’s vote to set}
24: if (|votes| = n) then {if all votes are proceed}
25: for all pk ∈ Π do
26: clue← sign(votes) {produce clue}
27: PL.send(pi, pk, ‘clue’, clue) {send clue}
28: else
29: released← true {set variable to true}
30: release(ϕ) {release ϕ}
31: upon PL.deliver(pj , pi, ‘clue’, clue) ∧ (¬released) do {PL callback and not released}
32: if validClue(clue) then {check if message is valid}
33: clues← clues ∪ {clue} {add pj’s clue to set}
34: if (|clues| > n/2) then {check if majority of clues}
35: released← true {set variable to true}
36: item← SB.unseal(sealedItem, clues) {unseal item using SB}
37: release(item) {release the unsealed item}
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Clue exchange phase. In this phase, process pi sends its clue to every
process and waits to receive the clues from a majority of processes (line 34).
Upon reception of a clue, the validClue() function checks if the clue contains
a signed set of all n proceed votes (line 32). With at least dn
2
+ 1e clues, it
can ask its secure module to release the sealed item by deciphering it using
its private key (line 36). The majority is necessary to ensure that at least
one correct process was able to produce its i-th clue in order for any process
to release its item. At this stage, correct processes should be able to release
without the help of any Byzantine process. Contrariwise, Byzantine processes
should not be able to release without the help of at least one correct process.
This aspect of our algorithm is further discussed in Section 3.4.
3.3.4 Examples of Executions
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present four possible executions of Algorithm 3.1 with three
processes and up to one Byzantine process. In all figures, the top line shows
the time line with the different time bounds, the top labels correspond to the
correct behavior, the arrows show the message transmissions and the bottom
labels (if any) give the Byzantine behavior of process p3.
Figure 3.4(a) shows an execution where all processes are correct. In Fig-
ure 3.4(b), process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior by
failing to send its clue. However, in this case, all the correct processes are still
able to release their items.
In Figure 3.5(a), process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from the correct behavior
by failing to send the item expected by p1. Thus p1 does not send its vote and
eventually every correct process releases the abort item ϕ. Yet p3 is not able
to release its item. In Figure 3.5(b), process p3 is Byzantine and deviates from
the correct behavior by failing to send its vote or by sending it too late. Thus
eventually every correct process release the abort item ϕ. Yet p3 is not able to
release its item.
3.3.5 Correctness Proof
In the following, we prove that Algorithm 3.1 solves fair exchange in the pres-
ence of b Byzantine processes, with b < n
2
, by preserving the validity, unique-
ness, non-triviality, termination, integrity and fairness properties of fair ex-
change. The restriction on the number of Byzantine processes is called the
honest majority assumption. Based on Lemma 4, the respective theorems
hereafter validate each property. In the following, the notation p′i describing a
trustee or a secure box is equivalent to that of SB used in Algorithm 3.1.
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(a) All three processes are correct.
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(b) Process p3 deviates from Algorithm 3.1 by not sending its clue.
Figure 3.4: Successful executions of Algorithm 3.1.
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(a) Process p3 deviates from Algorithm 3.1 by not sending its item.
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(b) Process p3 deviates from Algorithm 3.1 by not sending its vote.
Figure 3.5: Aborted executions of Algorithm 3.1.
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Lemma 4. If some correct process pj does not receive an encrypted item
matching description dj, then no process releases at line 37 of Algorithm 3.1.
Proof. If some correct process pj does not receive its expected item, it does
not send a proceed vote. Thus no process obtains the proceed vote from
pj. Since no process receives all n proceed votes and a clue is composed
of a signed set of n proceed votes, no process produces its clue. From the
no creation property of perfect links, no process receives any clue. Without a
majority of clues, no process is able to unseal the item at line 36 and hence to
release the item at line 37 of Algorithm 3.1.
Theorem 12 (Validity). If a correct process pi releases an item x, then either
x ∈M and x matches di, or x is the abort item ϕ.
Proof. A correct process pi explicitly releases the abort item ϕ at line 30, and
the only other case of release is at line 37. In the latter, pi releases the item that
is stored in variable sealedItem. From Lemma 4, if pi releases at line 37, it has
previously received an item matching di and stored it in variable sealedItem.
From the no creation property of perfect links, that item was sent and offered
by some process of Π. Since, from line 13, no subsequently received items can
be stored in sealedItem, at line 37, pi releases an item that belongs to M and
matches di.
Theorem 13 (Uniqueness). No correct process releases more than once.
Proof. The boolean variable released and the atomic execution assumption
prevent any correct process from releasing more than once.
Theorem 14 (Non-triviality). If all processes are correct, no process releases
the abort item ϕ.
Proof. Since all processes are correct, each process sends the correct encrypted
item at line 11 as agreed in the terms of the exchange. From the reliable
delivery property of perfect links, every process pi receives an item matching
description di before time t1 = t0 +∆PL, so every process produces and sends
its proceed vote at line 17 in a timely fashion. From the IC2 property of BA,
no process receives an invalid proceed vote. Therefore, no process releases
the abort item ϕ (line 30).
Theorem 15 (Termination). Every correct process eventually releases an item.
Proof. The time-out at line 18 ensures that every correct process starts all n
executions of BA at the same time. This implies that, from the existence of a
time bound for the termination of BA and the IC1 property of BA, there is a
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time after which either (a) every correct process receives at least one invalid
proceed vote and releases the abort item ϕ or (b) every correct process
receives all n valid proceed votes. In the latter case, every correct process
then produces and sends its i-th clue at line 27. From the reliable delivery
property of perfect links and the honest majority assumption, every correct
process receives a majority of clues and then releases at line 37.
Theorem 16 (Integrity). No process pj releases an item mi, with process pi
correct, if mi matches description dk of some correct process pk, with pk 6= pj.
Proof. Only in a single step of Algorithm 3.1, i.e., at line 11, does a correct
process pi transmit its item mi through the network. Since pi is correct, pi
encrypts mi using the key of p
′
k in order to send it through the network. Thus
no process other than pi and pk holds a deciphered version of mi and, since pi
and pk are correct, they do not send a deciphered version of mi to pj. From
the PKI unforgeability assumption, pj is not capable of obtaining a deciphered
version of mi. Thus pj does not release mi.
Theorem 17 (Fairness). If any process pi releases an item mj matching de-
scription di, with pi or pj correct, then every correct process pk releases an
item matching its description dk.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some correct process pk does not release an item matching de-
scription dk and that some other process pi releases an item mj matching
description di, with pi or pj correct. If pi releases mj (line 37), from assump-
tion on SB, pi must have received a majority of clues in some previous steps:
either (1) because pi is correct or (2) because pj is correct and encrypted mj
before sending it to pi (lines 10 and 11). From the honest majority assumption,
at least one of these clues is produced by some correct process px. Process px
therefore receives all n proceed votes. Thus, from the IC1 property of BA,
every correct process receives all n proceed votes. This implies that no cor-
rect process releases the abort item ϕ (line 30), including pk. From the validity
and termination properties of FE, if pk does not release the abort item ϕ, then
pk releases an item matching its description dk. A contradiction.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Are we being unfair to Byzantine processes?
Without gaining any advantage over correct processes, a Byzantine process
may systematically have all processes abort the exchange. However, this is
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only the case in the early stages of our algorithm, during the transmission of
the items or during the voting phase. Once the vote has been successfully
completed, correct processes execute the remainder of the protocol without
depending on the behavior of any Byzantine process. In other words, correct
processes may complete the exchange possibly at the expense of Byzantine
processes. So the question is: are we being unfair to Byzantine processes?
The answer is twofold.
Consider the case where a Byzantine process is truly malicious, in the sense
that, behind the process, there is a malevolent mind purposefully trying to
abuse the system. One can argue that the abuser is responsible for his own
fate. Even more so, since, if the correct processes are able to obtain their items,
there is nothing preventing a malicious process from successfully receiving its
item, even if it tried to corrupt the system, as illustrated in Figure 3.4(b).
Where a Byzantine process is merely malfunctioning, without any malicious
intention, e.g., in the case of a crash, a failing process might not be responsible
for the occurrence of the failure, so unfairness would then arguably prejudice an
otherwise correctly behaving process. This problem can be solved by assuming
a crash-recovery model, fair-loss (instead of perfect) links [ACT98] and some
local persistent storage available to each process.4 Indeed, with fair-loss links,
if the fair exchange protocol successfully reaches the key exchange phase, a
good process5 would eventually receive a majority of keys, and thus be able to
release its item. On the other hand, the use of fair-loss links does not prevent
an unfair outcome for a process that definitively crashes, i.e., a bad process.
However, in such a catastrophic event, one can argue that unfairness is less of
an issue, since the digital item is lost anyway.
3.4.2 Complexity Analysis
The performance of our solution is directly dependent on the performance of
the underlying modules used in Algorithm 3.1 and in particular on that of the
BA module. If BA reaches a decision in s communication steps, Algorithm 3.1
needs s + 2 communications steps to reach termination. In [DR82], it was
shown that the lower bound for deterministic BA is b + 1. This result pro-
vides us with a best possible performance of b + 3 communications steps for
Algorithm 3.1, with b Byzantine processes. Thus, in the worst case scenario,
termination is reached in dn
2
+ 2e communication steps.
4Upon recovery, such a persistent storage allows a crashed process to resume its activity
from where it stopped.
5A good process is a process that can crash and recover many times, but that eventually
remains up [ACT98].
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Regarding the number of messages, the cost analysis may be done for both a
broadcast network, in which a broadcast needs one message, and for a point-
to-point network, in which a broadcast needs n− 1 messages. In either cases,
the performance of Algorithm 3.1 in terms of number of messages depends on
the number of messages σ needed in BA. In a broadcast network, our solution
needs 2n + σ to reach termination. In a point-to-point network, our solution
needs n2+σ to reach termination. Results in [DR82] show that, for a point-to-
point network, the lower bound on the number of messages to reach agreement
in BA is O(nb). So the message cost for Algorithm 3.1 does not depend on the
number of Byzantine processes and our solution to fair exchange in a point-
to-point network requires O(n2) messages to reach termination.
♦♦♦
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Chapter 4
A Java Implementation
Criticism is something we can avoid easily
by saying nothing, doing nothing,
and being nothing.
Aristotle
Abstract. The main aim of this chapter is to present a pedagogical tool, developed
in the context of this thesis, for illustrating and apprehending the complexity of fair
exchange. We thus start by proposing a Java implementation of the modular fair
exchange algorithm detailed in the previous chapter. The application is completed
with a simple graphic user interface in order to set up, run and display executions of
our modular protocol. The exercise of implementing such an application leads to two
secondary achievements: (1) illustrating the challenges of translating from logical
pseudo language to programming language and (2) providing an implementation
of Byzantine behaviors. The wide range of Byzantine behaviors is achieved by
an approach that consists in refactoring the correct behavior and then creating
Byzantine subclasses.
4.1 Introduction
By presenting a practical Java implementation of fair exchange in the context
of a pedagogical tool, this chapter proposes a break from theoretical discussion,
as illustrated in Figure 4.1. However, it is logically linked to Chapter 3, since
the implementation is based on Algorithm 3.1. The aim is to allow for a
better understanding of such a protocol by providing a means to set up specific
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Figure 4.1: Thesis outline.
executions of the protocol and monitor them step-by-step through a graphical
user interface. The application is thus composed of the correct implementation
of fair exchange, implementations of a wide range of Byzantine behaviors and
the graphical user interface.
4.1.1 From a Pseudo to a Real Programming Language
When describing an algorithm, the use of a pseudo programming language is
appropriate precisely because the high-level syntax of such a language allows us
to focus on the semantics of the algorithm, while hiding irrelevant implemen-
tation details. However, certain implicit assumptions inherent to this syntax
need to be addressed when implementing an algorithm in a real programming
language such as Java.
While certain abstractions, e.g., the fair exchange (FE) module, are explicit
in the theoretical architecture shown in Figure 3.3 others are implicit. This is
the case with the notion of process, which obviously requires a corresponding
abstraction in the Java implementation. Figure 4.2 shows the structure of our
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implementation, which is based on the theoretical architecture. Each module
employed in our solution is represented by one instance of a respective class,
e.g., the SB class implements the behavior of the secure box (SB) module. For
simplicity of implementation, the abstract Byzantine agreement (BA) module
is divided into n instances1 of the BA class, each running an execution for a
distinct General, i.e., one instance of the module per voter.2 The perfect link
module is implemented by two classes: Network and NetworkQueue.
Process 3Process 2Process 1
Application 1 Application 2 Application 3
Network
SB SB SB
BA
1:1:1
BA
1:1:2
BA
1:1:3
BA
2:1:1
BA
2:1:2
BA
2:1:3
BA
3:1:1
BA
3:1:2
BA
3:1:3
FE 1:1 FE 2:1 FE 3:1
Network
Queues
Figure 4.2: Communication architecture.
In a pseudo programming language, as used in Chapter 3, the ability of the
various modules to communicate with counterparts is implicit. In a given pro-
cess, modules communicate with the module above or the ones below them by
calling primitives. In order to communicate with their corresponding modules
in other processes, they rely on message passing.
In Java, while calling primitives is done using the reference of an object, mes-
sage passing requires the explicit identification of the modules in the commu-
nication architecture in order to deliver properly the various messages, i.e.,
each module must be identified by a distinct address. In a specific exchange,
processes are identified by an integer ranging from 1 to n. An instance of the
FE class is thus identified by the process and exchange numbers, e.g., “2:1” as
in Figure 4.2. The identification of a BA object is obtained by the concatena-
tion of the ID of the FE object with the process number of its General, e.g.,
“2:1:3” identifies the BA instance running on process 2 that will deliver the
vote of process 3 (in exchange 1).
Another major difficulty occulted by pseudo languages is the management
1The number n is the total number of processes in an exchange.
2In Byzantine agreement, the General is the process broadcasting the message.
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of concurrency. In the description of a distributed algorithm, it is implicit
that parts of the code need to be executed concurrently. For example, in Algo-
rithm 3.1, the upon syntax does not specify how the code will be executed, i.e.,
by which thread of execution, and how atomicity will be achieved. This partic-
ular issue is discussed when presenting the sequence diagram in Section 4.2.2.
4.2 A Java Implementation of Fair Exchange
In this section, we present the implementation of our modular solution, i.e.,
Algorithm 3.1 of Section 3.3. The core of our application is described using
UML3 [Alh98, Fow03], i.e., through a static model (class diagram) and a
dynamic one (sequence diagram). The functional model (use-case diagrams)
is omitted since it corresponds to the functional and behavioral requirements
of fair exchange, thoroughly described in Chapter 1.
4.2.1 Static Model
The implementation of our modular protocol relies on a series of Java classes,
each mapping a single module of the layered architecture. Figure 4.3 provides
a complete class diagram of the implementation of Algorithm 3.1. While the
FE, BA and SB classes play the respective roles of the modules of our solu-
3Unified Modeling Language.
messagemodel
Application
NetworkNetworkQueue
FE
BA
SB Message
BAListener
<interface>
FEListener
<interface>
NetworkListener
<interface>
BAMessage
FEMessage
NetworkMessage
implements inheritsreferences
Figure 4.3: Class diagram.
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tion, i.e., the fair exchange, Byzantine agreement and secure box modules, the
Network and NetworkQueues classes correspond to the perfect link module. In
order to communicate with one another, while preserving as little coupling as
possible, the classes implement one or more of the following Java interfaces:
FEListener, BAListener and NetworkListener.
The listener pattern achieves the intended modularity by keeping the lower
layered modules unaware of the modules built on top of them. For example,
the FE module has a reference to the Network module but the opposite is not
true. So, in order to receive messages from processes in the network, the FE
module registers to the Network module as a NetworkListener. Any module
implementing the NetworkListener interface can thus register to the Network
module. Moreover, modularity is further achieved through the use of a specific
Java interface for each module. These interfaces, not shown in Figure 4.3,
allow the implementation and the specification of modules to be kept sepa-
rate. In the above example with the FE and Network modules, the FE module
actually references the Network interface, not the class, so the implementation
of the network can be modified without impacting the implementation of any
other module. Messages transmitted through these interfaces are found in the
package message and are all subclasses of the super-class Message.
4.2.2 Dynamic Model
Figure 4.4 shows a detailed sequence diagram of the execution of the fair
exchange protocol, while Figure 4.5 shows the fair exchange algorithm mapped
against the execution sequence of the code of the FE class taken from Figure 4.4.
In each process, the Application thread (Thread 1 in Figure 4.4) initializes an
instance of the FE class by calling the constructor method. The FE module
connects to the network, which assigns it to an instance of NetworkQueue, and
creates n instances of the BA class. The BA modules connect to the network,
which again assigns a respective instance of NetworkQueue, and start their own
thread of execution (Thread 2). The NetworkQueue objects of all modules also
start their own threads of execution (Thread 3 for the NetworkQueue objects of
FE modules and Thread 4 for those of BA modules). At this point, the threads
of both the BA modules and the NetworkQueue objects are ready and waiting.
Once Thread 1 has created all the modules, it goes into wait mode, using the
wait-and-notify monitor of an instance of the Trigger class, which is used
as a synchronizer. The last Thread 1 to finish the creation process triggers
the beginning of the exchange by notifying all the others through this same
instance of the Trigger class, ensuring that all processes start the exchange
at roughly the same time.
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FE
1
1
3
1
3
2
Algorithm 3.1 Fair exchange protocol executed by process pi
1: Uses:
2: Perfect Link (PL), Byzantine Agreement (BA), Secure Box (SB)
3: Initialisation:
4: t0 ← time() {set t0 to starting time}
5: di ← ... {set description to known value}
6: released ← false {set variable to false}
7: sealedItem ← ⊥ {set variable to null}
8: votes, clues ← ∅ {set variables to empty set}
9: function offer(mi, pr)
10: item ← encrypt(mi, p
′
r) {encrypt mi using public key of p
′
r}
11: PL.send(pi, pr, ‘item’, item) {send encrypted item to pr}
12: upon PL.deliver(ps, pi, ‘item’, item) do {PL callback}
13: if (sealedItem = ⊥) then {check for duplicate send}
14: sealedItem ← item {store received item}
15: if SB.isValidItem(sealedItem, di) then {ask SB to check item}
16: vote ← sign(‘proceed’) {produce proceed vote}
17: BA.send(pi, vote) {send vote}
18: upon time() > t0 + ∆PL do {item exchange phase is over}
19: for all pj ∈ Π do {for all processes}
20: BA.start(pj) {start BA}
21: upon BA.deliver(pj , vote) ∧ (¬released) do {BA callback and not released}
22: if validProceedVote(vote) then {check vote}
23: votes ← votes ∪ vote {add pj’s vote to set}
24: if (|votes| = n) then {if all votes are proceed}
25: for all pk ∈ Π do
26: clue ← sign(votes) {produce clue}
27: PL.send(pi, pk, ‘clue’, clue) {send clue}
28: else
29: released ← true {set variable to true}
30: release(ϕ) {release ϕ}
31: upon PL.deliver(pj , pi, ‘clue’, clue) ∧ (¬released) do {PL callback and not released}
32: if validClue(clue) then {check if message is valid}
33: clues ← clues ∪ {clue} {add pj’s clue to set}
34: if (|clues| > n/2) then {check if majority of clues}
35: released ← true {set variable to true}
36: item ← SB.unseal(sealedItem, clues) {unseal item using SB}
37: release(item) {release the unsealed item}
Figure 4.5: Threads running Algorithm 3.1.
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As shown on Figure 4.4, the actual exchange starts by having each Thread 1 call
the offer method of the FE module. The execution then follows precisely our
fair exchange algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 3.1. However, it is interesting to notice
how the different threads combine to execute the code of the algorithm, as
shown in Figure 4.5. Thread 1 runs the item exchange phase of Algorithm 3.1,
by sending the item to the corresponding FE module, and then waits for the
duration of a given value of the delay ∆PL. Thread 3 (the NetworkQueue
thread of the FE module) delivers the item, checks with the SB module whether
the item matches its description and sends the vote to the BA module. Once
the delay ∆PL is over, Thread 1 triggers the voting phase by notifying each
Thread 2 (the BA thread) running on the same process. The BA modules go
through their own protocols, shown inside the repeat box and described in
the following section, and their threads then deliver the votes of each process.
If all votes are gathered correctly, the last Thread 2 to finish starts the clue
exchange phase by sending the clue to all the processes. Finally, Thread 3
delivers the clues and, once a majority is reached, calls the unseal method of
the SB module and releases the item.
4.2.3 Byzantine Agreement Module
Since our solution relies on a Byzantine agreement (BA) module, it requires
providing its implementation. In our application, the implementation of the
Byzantine agreement protocol is based on the algorithm with signed messages
presented in [LSP82]. The protocol provides a means to broadcast messages
reliably, which is used to broadcast the votes in the case of fair exchange.
Intuitively, this is achieved by having all the processes repeatedly sign and
echo messages for a certain number of rounds. For the Byzantine agreement
protocol with signed messages, this means going through b+ 1 rounds, with b
being the maximum number of Byzantine processes. Therefore, in the context
of our fair exchange solution, where there is a majority of correct processes,
the required number of rounds is bn+1
2
c.
Every FE module creates n BA modules, each having a distinct process as its
General, i.e., the process sending its vote. In the first round, the General sends
its vote to all the Lieutenants, i.e., all the other processes.4 The Lieutenants
then sign and echo the vote until it reaches a majority of processes, i.e., until
the vote has gone through the required number of rounds. If all the messages
of a single execution of BA are valid proceed votes, the BA module delivers a
proceed vote to the FE module. Otherwise, if messages are missing or one of
the messages contained some other value, it delivers an abort vote.
4In the analogy used in [LSP82], the terms General and Lieutenants correspond respec-
tively to the sender and the receivers of a message broadcast.
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In [LSP82], the fact that processes are able to detect the absence of a message
is an important requirement. For example, in the first round, a Lieutenant
should be able to detect that it did not receive the General’s message. The
assumption was explicitly implemented in our application by calculating the
total number of messages that a process should receive in a correct execution
of the Byzantine agreement protocol. This implies being able to verify that
messages are not received more than once, i.e., messages with the same list
of signatures should be taken into account only once. The total number of
messages is easily computable from the number of messages a process should
receive in a given round, which is a function of n, the number of processes, and
r, the round number. In a round r, a Lieutenant p should receive one message
per possible arrangement of r process signatures. However, the first signature
is necessarily the General’s and the message does not include the signature of
p. Thus, in each round, the number of messages any Lieutenant should receive
is a permutation of n− 2 elements over r − 1 positions:
P n−2r−1 =
(n− 2)!
(n− r − 1)! .
The total number Q of expected messages for a single Lieutenant can be com-
puted as the sum of the permutations for each rounds. When n is an even
number,
Q =
n
2∑
r=1
(n− 2)!
(n− r − 1)! ,
and when n is odd,
Q =
n+1
2∑
r=1
(n− 2)!
(n− r − 1)! .
At the end of a BA execution, the number of messages received is thus verified
against the number of expected messages. Table 4.1 presents the values for the
number of expected messages for various numbers of participating processes.
4.2.4 Secure Box Module
As argued in Chapter 3, the aim of our solution is to rely on the secure box (SB)
module as little as possible. Its implementation is thus reduced to two simple
methods: one for verifying that the item received matches its description and
the other for unsealing the item once the proof has been gathered. For sim-
plicity and performance, the current implementation only simulates the use of
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Table 4.1: Number of messages per process in a given round of BA.
Number of processes
Round 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 - - - 6 12 20 30 42 56
4 - - - - - 60 120 210 336
5 - - - - - - - 840 1680
Total 1 2 3 10 17 86 157 1100 2081
encryption by adding a special value to the item. At this point, proper en-
cryption using a PKI infrastructure is not necessary since we essentially want
to build a pedagogical tool. However, due to the modularity of our solution,
replacing the SB module by one relying on a real PKI infrastructure is quite
straightforward.
4.2.5 Network Module
The perfect link module of our solution is implemented by relying on the
Network and NetwordQueue classes. The latter is a basic message queue with
a dedicated thread that delivers messages following a FIFO5 order. The former
provides a means for processes to send messages reliably through the network.
Since the purpose of the application is to illustrate executions of the proto-
col, for simplicity, the implementation is local, i.e., it relies on local references
instead of remote ones, as provided by the RMI6 infrastructure, or concrete
network addresses. Again, however, the modularity of our structure would
allow the implementation of the Network class to be modified to support dis-
tributed executions. This particular implementation thus implies that all the
processes run on the same virtual machine.
5First In, First Out.
6Remote Method Invocation.
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4.3 Implementing Byzantine Behaviors
When illustrating executions of fair exchange or any other Byzantine-failure-
tolerant algorithm, a key aspect is the need to implement Byzantine behaviors.
Exhibiting a fault-tolerant protocol without the occurrence of failures is rather
meaningless. However, implementing a wide range of Byzantine behaviors can
be challenging. We therefore propose to address this task efficiently by refac-
toring the implementation of the correct behavior and then building a hier-
archy of Byzantine behaviors all inheriting from the correct behavior. While
this is carried out in the context of our fair exchange protocol, the interesting
aspect of this contribution is that it is a general approach applicable to any
Byzantine-tolerant algorithm.
4.3.1 Refactoring the Correct Implementation
Our approach consists in taking advantage of inheritance to allow Byzantine
implementations to modify any single line of code of the correct protocol. The
first step is thus to refactor the structure of the correct implementation. For
example, Code Listing 4.1 shows the correct implementation of an excerpt
of Algorithm 3.1 before modification (see Figure 4.5). Lines 12-17 of Algo-
rithm 3.1 are mapped to lines 3-6 of Code Listing 4.1.
Code Listing 4.1: Java method before modification.
1 public void deliver(NetworkMessage message){
2 if (!released)
3 if (message.getType().equals("item") && sealedItem == null)
4 if(sb.isValidItem(message.getObject(),description)){
5 sealedItem = message.getObject();
6 baGeneral.send(sign("PROCEED"));
7 }
8 else if (message.getType().equals("clue"))
9 [...]
10 }
The refactoring is achieved by first splitting the code into sub-methods, each
containing a single line of the algorithm. In Code Listing 4.2, the lines 5
and 6 of Code Listing 4.1 are respectively located at lines 18 and 23. We
then prepare the correct implementation in order to support crash-stop and
crash-recovery behaviors by adding verifications of the status of the module
before executing any single line, e.g., lines 16 and 17. In the case of crash-
recovery, the method crashRecovery is implemented in order to put in wait
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Code Listing 4.2: Java method after modification.
1 public void deliver(NetworkMessage message){
2 crashRecovery();
3 if (!released && !crashed)
4 if (message.getType().equals("item") && sealedItem == null)
5 deliverCryptedItem(message);
6 else if (message.getType().equals("clue"))
7 [...]
8 }
9 protected void deliverCryptedItem(NetworkMessage message){
10 if(sb.isValidItem(message.getObject(), description)){
11 deliverCryptedItem01(message);
12 deliverCryptedItem02(message);
13 }
14 }
15 protected void deliverCryptedItem01(NetworkMessage message){
16 crashRecovery();
17 if(!crashed)
18 sealedItem = message.getObject();
19 }
20 protected void deliverCryptedItem02(NetworkMessage message){
21 crashRecovery();
22 if(!crashed)
23 baGeneral.send(sign("PROCEED"));
24 }
Code Listing 4.3: Implementing a method to allow crash-recovery behaviors.
1 protected void crashRecovery(){
2 while(down)
3 synchronized (this)
4 try
5 this.wait();
6 catch (InterruptedException e)
7 e.printStackTrace();
8 }
mode any thread trying to run the code of a module that is set to down (see
Code Listing 4.3). Finally, a dedicated crash-recovery thread is added in the
correct implementation. However, it stops immediately, i.e., the run method is
left empty, and is only added in order to be overridden in Byzantine subclasses.
By creating sub-methods for each line, the modifications obviously add some
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complexity to the code of the correct implementation. However, the refactoring
allows for better re-use of the code of the correct behavior, by permitting each
line of the algorithm to be isolated in order to achieve deviating behaviors,
while leaving the rest of the code unchanged. This provides flexibility for
implementing any type of Byzantine behavior: crash-stop, crash-recovery or
malicious failures.
4.3.2 From Correct to Byzantine through Inheritance
The correct implementation is used as a superclass for creating Byzantine sub-
classes, as shown in Fig 4.6. By adequately overriding just one method of the
superclass, i.e., a single line in the correct algorithm, a Byzantine implemen-
tation can be produced. For example, producing a crash-stop behavior only
requires overriding one of the methods of the superclass with the method of
Code Listing 4.4. The example is given for the correct deliverCryptedItem02
method presented in Code Listing 4.2.
model
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CrashPhase1
FESpec
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implements
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Figure 4.6: Class diagram of the Byzantine behaviors.
Code Listing 4.4: Overriding a method to produce a crash-stop behavior.
1 protected void deliverCryptedItem01(NetworkMessage message){
2 crashed = true;
3 }
For producing a crash-recovery failure, the run method can be implemented as
in Code Listing 4.5. In the example, while the status of the module is not set to
either good7 or crashed, the crash-recovery thread regularly modifies the value
7Captures the status of a crashing-and-recovering module that has eventually stopped
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of the boolean variable down. The delay of the loop can range from constant
to totally random, as well as decreasing or increasing, by implementing the
getSleepDelay method accordingly. The eventualStatus method provides a
means to implement either good or bad modules, i.e., according to the desired
behavior this method can set the status of the module to good or crashed, in
which case the crash-recovery behavior stops.
Code Listing 4.5: Run method for the crash-recovery behavior.
1 public void run(){
2 while(!good && !crashed){
3 try
4 Thread.sleep(getSleepDelay());
5 catch ( InterruptedException e )
6 e.printStackTrace();
7 // Allows to eventually set status to good or crashed
8 eventualStatus();
9 if(down || good || crashed){
10 down = false;
11 synchronized (this)
12 this.notifyAll();
13 } else
14 down = true;
15 }
16 }
The crash-recovery behavior requires that threads executing the protocol can
be (1) put on hold as soon as the module is down and (2) released when it
is up again. The latter is achieved at line 12 of Code Listing 4.5 by having
the crash-recovery thread notify all the threads that were waiting since the
module was down. Once the notifyAll method is called by the crash-recovery
thread, executing threads are able to proceed with the normal execution of the
protocol, unless the status has meanwhile been set to down again.
Implementing truly malicious behaviors may require overriding methods with
more complex code. However, the inheritance from the superclass is con-
venient, since it provides an otherwise correctly behaving malicious module.
More sophisticated malicious behaviors may be achieved by combining Byzan-
tine behaviors through a hierarchy of Byzantine subclasses.
crashing. Note that, in the crash-recovery failure model, the term good designates both
correct and eventually correct processes.
4.4. A Visualization Tool 79
4.4 A Visualization Tool
One of the goals of the implementation is to provide a tool, i.e., a graphic user
interface, allowing the execution of our fair exchange protocol to be monitored.
The structure of our application follows the Model-View-Controller (MVC)
architectural pattern [Bur92]. It allows the isolation of the data (model) from
user interface (view) and data access (controller) concerns, so that changes to
the user interface do not affect the data handling. In our application, the model
corresponds to the implementation of the fair exchange protocol presented in
Section 4.2, while the graphic user interface provides both the view and the
controller. This is illustrated in Figure 4.7, which extends the class diagram of
Figure 4.3. The view package contains the classes of the graphic user interface
presented below. The support package gathers the classes required by most
others, such as the classes Preferences and LogWriter, which allows objects
to write into the log file during executions of the protocol.
supportview
model
Main StartFrameLogFrame
Preferences
<abstract class>
LogWriter
references
Figure 4.7: Extended class diagram.
The difficulty of providing a practical visualization tool resides in observing
executions without affecting their normal outcome. While direct observation of
an execution may be possible, it is mostly impractical since executions cannot
be stopped or even slowed down without impacting them. Our solution thus
consists in relying on the log of the execution, which can then be viewed at any
convenient speed. The visualization tool combines two windows, one for setting
up and triggering an execution, and the other for displaying the resulting log
file of the execution.
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4.4.1 Execution Setup
Figure 4.8 shows the setup window of our application, where the preferences
for an execution can be configured. From this window, a user can choose to
create a log file for a new execution or open a file previously stored on the hard
drive.
Figure 4.8: Setup window.
To create a new log file, the user must first define a path for the file by using the
New Log button. He can then modify the default terms of the exchange, which
are defined by the string values in the offer and want textfields. A specific
behavior for each participant process can also be chosen. There is no limitation
on the number of Byzantine processes, since illustrating bad executions may
be interesting for pedagogical purposes. Finally, the user can set the delay
for a single transmission on the network and the number of processes in the
exchange. The delay corresponds to the value of ∆PL as defined in the previous
chapters. Once all the preferences have been defined, the user can trigger the
execution of the exchange by using the Run Execution button, which then opens
the monitoring window. While our graphic user interface allows a maximum
of five processes, an exchange with any number of processes can be executed
by using the command line and the class Main, as shown in Figure 4.7. This
last feature is a direct result of the adoption of the MVC architectural pattern,
since the model is completely isolated and independent of any choices made
regarding the user interface.
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Alternatively, the user can simply click on the Open Log button and choose
an existing log file. Once a file is selected, the monitoring window opens to
display the details of the logged execution.
4.4.2 Running an Execution
Figure 4.9 shows the two windows composing our graphic user interface, cor-
responding to the two classes of the view package, and the steps allowing
executions to be visualized. Once the Run Execution button is pressed, the
preferences are updated and the execution of the exchange starts. The prefer-
ences are then retrieved by the model and the execution follows the description
of Figure 4.4. Just before the execution of the fair exchange protocol, a log file
is created. This is a text file written into during the execution of the exchange
in order to log the actions of each process.
Log FilePreferences model
(1) set execution
preferences
(2) start
execution
(3) get execution
preferences
(4) write in execution log 
through LogWriter Class
(6) parse
log file(5) open execution monitor
Figure 4.9: Execution sequence of the graphic user interface.
After the exchange protocol is completed, the second window appears. This
window retrieves the log file and parses the first lines of the text file to display
the labels according to the preferences. The parsing of the rest of the file is
then done according to the actions performed by the user through the interface
of the execution monitor.
82 Chapter 4. A Java Implementation
4.4.3 Execution Monitor
The monitoring window of our application shown in Figure 4.10 is composed
of six textfields, one for the network and five for the processes. The textfields
display the actions taken by the respective processes. Smaller boxes link the
network textfield with the process textfields by displaying the number of mes-
sages waiting in the incoming message queue of each process. The labels of
each textfield and those found in the lower right of the window recall the
preferences chosen in the setup window. The bottom of the window provides
the control buttons for viewing the execution of the exchange. An execution
can thus be displayed at any speed. It can be paused momentarily with the
Play/Pause button, slowed down or speeded up using the Speed slider and also
viewed action by action with the Step by Step button. The New Exchange
button opens the setup window for a new execution.
Figure 4.10: Monitoring window.
While this display is an interesting pedagogical tool, a potential improvement
would be to make the visualization more graphical, e.g., by having moving
graphical elements representing transfers of messages.
♦♦♦
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Part III
Comparison & Generalization
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Chapter 5
Fair Exchange vs. Secure
Multiparty Computation
Our shortcomings are the eyes with which we see the ideal.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Abstract. In this chapter, we propose a comparison of fair exchange and secure
multiparty computation. Despite their apparent similarity, these two problems arise
respectively from the fields of distributed systems and of modern cryptography. The
wide differences of description and approach in these research fields render hazardous
a straightforward comparison of the various results and solutions. By introducing a
common specification framework for the two problems, we examine the differences
regarding their generality and properties, and conclude with a discussion on the
possible origins of the confusion surrounding certain results found in the literature.
5.1 Introduction
The problem of secure multiparty computation (SMC) comes from the field of
modern cryptography and consists in allowing a group of parties to compute a
specific function securely, i.e., with the input of each party remaining private
to all others. The motivation behind this problem is to study to what extent
a group of mutually distrustful parties can emulate a centralized trusted third
party. Accordingly, the SMC problem is set in a real model, with no trusted
third party, and is specified with respect to an ideal model, in which all the
computation is executed by a centralized trusted third party.
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Figure 5.1: Thesis outline.
The problem of fair exchange (FE) on the other hand comes from the general
problem of exchanging values between mutually distrustful parties. As pre-
sented in the properties of Section 1.3.2 (page 16), the exchange is fair if either
all parties obtain their desired values or no party obtains anything useful. The
approach of fair exchange is opposed to that of secure multiparty computation,
as illustrated in Figure 5.1, in the sense that its problem specification is not
based on any ideal model. In other words, in the case of fair exchange, the
centralized trusted third party is merely a solution to the problem and not a
standard of measurement.
This chapter proposes a comparison of these two problems, which are con-
fusingly similar. On one hand, the close connection that both problems have
with the concept of trusted third party may indeed give the impression that
they are somehow equivalent. On the other hand, several results found in their
respective literature, i.e., modern cryptography and distributed systems, seem
to be contradictory. Because the specifications of both problems differ greatly
in form, making sense out of these confounding results is not straightforward.
Moreover one can find very little in the literature about measuring one prob-
lem against the other. To compare SMC and FE, our approach consists in first
5.1. Introduction 87
introducing a common specification framework for describing the problems and
then exposing their connections in order to bridge the gap between them.
5.1.1 Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC): a Brief
History
The SMC problem was first introduced by [Yao82] and has been extensively
studied since then. If the functional definition of the problem is usually de-
scribed using a mathematical function, the way of defining the security prop-
erties or behavioral constraints has evolved considerably from [Yao82]. The
definition of the behavioral constraints was first presented through descriptions
of properties and later by relying on the simulation approach [Can00, Gol04,
GL02], in which the level of security in the real model is defined by emulation
of an ideal model relying on a trusted third party (TTP). This approach is
now widely used.
Whether described by a set of properties or by the simulation approach, the
level of security has been of much debate in the literature. While there is
a consensus on including the notions of privacy,1 requiring that inputs re-
main hidden to all other processes, and correctness,2 ensuring that outputs
are computed correctly, it is not the case for fairness and termination. The
list below provides an excerpt of the hierarchy of SMC definitions of [GL02],
which presents various degrees in the notions of fairness and termination. As
for correctness and privacy, they are ensured in all definitions.
• Secure computation with abort – Ensures privacy of inputs and correct-
ness of outputs. However, it does not ensure termination, i.e., honest
parties have no guarantees of receiving an output, so neither is fairness.
• Secure computation with unanimous abort – Besides privacy, correctness,
ensures that either all honest parties receive their correct outputs or all
honest parties abort. In this case, different levels of fairness can be
considered, depending on what the adversary3 obtains:
◦ No fairness – Ensures nothing more than fairness among honest
parties: the adversary can always take advantage of honest parties.
◦ Complete fairness – Ensures that honest parties are guaranteed to
receive a correct output if the adversary does. Note that, in the
1Corresponds to integrity in the set of properties of our definition of fair exchange.
2Corresponds to validity in the set of properties of our definition of fair exchange.
3In cryptography, the term adversary usually designates the entity controlling all the
dishonest parties.
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literature, the definition of SMC with complete fairness is usually
referred to as fair computation.
Although there is a wide range of SMC definitions, it now seems to be standard
that the focus is on providing privacy and correctness but not termination or
fairness [GL02, MR91], i.e., secure computation with abort. Indeed, based
on [LLR02] the authors of [GL02] argue that, since Byzantine agreement
cannot be composed4 with two thirds or more Byzantine processes, security
should be decoupled from agreement, which is closely related to termination
and fairness. Based on this last argument, the definition of SMC that we
consider in this chapter corresponds to secure computation with abort.
Not surprisingly, research on SMC has also produced an impressive body
of work regarding solutions, impossibilities and lower bounds. In [BGW88,
CCD88, RB89] for instance, it is sequentially shown that any multiparty pro-
tocol can be achieved in an unconditionally secure manner, provided that the
system is synchronous and that there is an honest majority of peers. These
results even provide some level of fairness, as also does [GL90]. In the hier-
archy of [GL02] mentioned above, the level of fairness in [RB89] matches the
definition of secure computation with unanimous abort and complete fairness,
also known as fair computation. The authors of [BGK04] propose an efficient
solution to fair computation that relies on security modules inspired by the
approach introduced for solving fair exchange [AV03]. However, as argued in
Section 5.5, this definition of fairness differs notably from the one specified in
the context of fair exchange.
5.2 An Integrated Specification Framework
We consider a distributed system consisting of a set Π of n fully interconnected
processes, Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. Processes communicate by message passing, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2. The system is synchronous : it exhibits synchronous
computation and synchronous communication, i.e., there exist upper bounds
on processing and communication delays. The execution of algorithm A is
then defined as a sequence of steps executed by processes of Π. In each step,
a process has the opportunity of atomically performing all of the following
actions: (1) send a message, (2) receive a message and (3) update its local
state. In each step, the process can of course choose to skip any of these
actions, e.g., if it has nothing to send. Based on this definition, a Byzantine
process is one that deviates from A in any way, so a Byzantine process is
4The term composed relates to the fact of running concurrent executions of a specific
protocol. In the case of Byzantine agreement with signed messages, the argument is that
messages from one execution could be re-used in order to lie in some other execution.
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Byzantine against a specific algorithm A. Byzantine failures can indeed only
be defined with respect to some algorithm [DGG05].
The fields of modern cryptography and distributed systems apply their own
distinct approaches when describing the problems of SMC and FE, respectively.
However both problems are comparable to that of a cooperative multi-player
game. The specifications are divided into two distinct parts: (1) a functional
definition, which is equivalent to the goal of the game, and (2) behavioral
constraints, corresponding to the rules under which the game is played.
Process
Figure 5.2: A fully connected topology, with five processes.
5.2.1 Functional Definition
Modern cryptography describes the functional definition using a mathemati-
cal function, whereas distributed systems rely on a set of primitives. While
these approaches may appear different, they are quite similar, with the for-
mer being slightly more formal. In modern cryptography, the functionality is
described as a whole, with all the inputs and outputs, whereas in distributed
systems, it is usually described using one primitive to allow each process to
provide its input and a second primitive to allow each process to receive its
output value. For example, modern cryptography would define a function
f : (y1, . . . , yi, . . . , yn) = f(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn). In distributed systems, this
function would be translated into the two following primitives along with a
description of their semantics:
input(xi) – Enables process pi to provide its input xi.
output(yi) – Allows process pi to obtain output yi. (Works as a callback.)
For the functional definition, the use of a mathematical function is probably
preferable, since it is more precise than the description of primitives.
90 Chapter 5. Fair Exchange vs. Secure Multiparty Computation
5.2.2 Behavioral Constraints
For the second part of the specification, modern cryptography usually de-
fines the constraints regarding acceptable and unacceptable behaviors by anal-
ogy with a model relying on a trusted third party (TTP), named the ideal
model [Gol04, GL02]. Thus the constraints are described by saying that the
real model, i.e., one not relying on a TTP, should ensure the same proper-
ties as in the ideal model. In contrast, the field of distributed systems re-
lies on an exhaustive set of properties describing both what should happen
and what cannot happen, named respectively liveness and safety properties
[GR06d]. Commonly found properties include, e.g., termination, which is a
liveness property stating that all processes eventually obtain an output value,
and uniqueness, which is a safety property stating that no process can obtain
more than one output value. If the simplicity of the analogy with the ideal
model seems appealing, we argue that it is inadequate and possibly misleading.
This is indeed the case because the guarantees offered by a TTP are too strong
and are thus impossible to emulate in the real model. The only possible way
for the real model to live up to the ideal model is to downgrade the ideal model
to a not-so-ideal model [Gol04]. Thus, although relying on a set of properties
may be less intuitive, it is nonetheless a preferable approach, especially when
comparing SMC and FE.
Table 5.1: Specifications in modern cryptography and distributed systems.
Modern Cryptography Distributed Systems
Functional
Definition
By defining a
mathematical function.
By declaring a set of
primitives.
Behavioral
Constraints
By analogy with a trusted
third party.
By declaring a set of
properties.
As summarized in Table 5.1, our specification framework is based on what
we believe to be the preferable approach from both worlds, i.e., a mathemat-
ical function to describe the functional definition and a set of properties to
define the behavioral constraints. In the following, we propose to revisit the
specification of SMC and FE using this integrated specification framework.
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5.3 Revisiting the Specification of the SMC
Problem
The secure multiparty computation problem consists in a group of processes
trying to compute a common function securely with the inputs from all pro-
cesses. The difficulty of the problem resides in achieving privacy, i.e., keeping
each input hidden from all other processes. Note that Byzantine processes
may omit to provide an input value, in which case the computation may not
terminate.
5.3.1 Functional Definition
More formally, each process is required to compute securely the result of a
well-known deterministic function: (y1, . . . , yn) = f(x1, . . . , xn), where xi and
yi are respectively the inputs and outputs of process pi. Interestingly, in the
SMC literature, the domain of definition is usually not clearly defined. This is
probably because it is not really an issue when dealing with correctness and
privacy. However, it is essential when fairness is at stake.
5.3.2 Behavioral Constraints
Secure multiparty computation allows processes to compute the result of a
specific function securely, with each process providing an input value and ex-
pecting to receive an output value as the result of the computation. In order
to achieve this cooperative goal, there are a number of behavioral constraints
to respect, which are described by the set of properties below. At the end
of the computation of the function f , we say that process pi outputs a value,
meaning that the function returns the output value to pi. This convention
comes from the field of distributed systems and is similar to the one used for
classical deliver primitives, e.g., in reliable broadcast primitives [HT93].
The SMC problem is usually defined in the modern cryptographic literature
by relying on a TTP [Gol04], since the problem was originally described to
provide the same guarantees as a TTP. However, in the perspective of bridging
the gap between SMC and FE, we define the semantics of SMC using a set of
abstract properties. We aim at matching as closely as possible the definition
given in [Gol04], which corresponds to the commonly accepted definition of
SMC in the field of modern cryptography.
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Validity. If a correct process pi outputs a value yi, then yi was computed
using function f and with at least the inputs of all correct processes.5
Uniqueness. No correct process outputs more than one value.
Non-triviality. If all processes are correct, every process outputs a value.
Privacy. No process pj outputs the input value xi or output value yi of any
correct process pi, apart from what is possibly given away by inputs and
outputs of Byzantine processes.
The validity and privacy properties are intrinsic to the specification of the
SMC problem, while uniqueness implicitly derives from the ideal model based
on a TTP. The non-triviality property can be found in most – possibly in
all – distributed systems problems, as it becomes evidently necessary when
trying to provide any meaningful solution. According to [Gol04], ensuring a
liveness property, e.g., termination, is not part of the specification of the SMC
problem. This is not the case in [BGK04], where the authors rely on secure
modules and are thus able to ensure termination. However, we argue that
[BGK04] describes a stronger problem than the usual problem of SMC and
thus, accordingly, omitting termination from our specification better captures
the essence of SMC as commonly defined in modern cryptography.
5.4 Revisiting the Specification of the Fair Ex-
change (FE) Problem
The fair exchange problem consists in a group of processes trying to exchange
inputs specified ex ante, i.e., each process provides a specific input and expects
the input of some other process in exchange. The difficulty of the problem
resides in achieving fairness. Intuitively, fairness means that, if one process
obtains its desired output, then all processes involved in the exchange should
also obtain their desired output.
5.4.1 Functional Definition
More formally, each process is required to compute the result of a deterministic
function F : (y1, . . . , yn) = F (x1, . . . , xn), where xi and yi are respectively the
inputs and outputs of process pi. When all processes are correct, the outcome
of F is defined by a function f , a permutation with no fixed points, with
5In the literature of SMC, validity is usually referred to as correctness.
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input domain X = X1 × . . .×Xn, where Xi = {xi}, a set containing a single
specific value, and output domain Y = Y1 × . . . × Yn, where Yi = {yi} and
(y1, . . . , yn) = f(x1, . . . , xn).
6 Thus the terms of the exchange are defined by
f , X and Y . Function f therefore provides the outputs of F when the inputs
provided are those expected, i.e., they belong to the domain of f , and the
computation achieves completion.7 However, if this is not the case, F outputs
a special value ϕ for all processes. This special value ϕ indicates that the
exchange aborted. Function F is defined as follows:
F (x1, . . . , xn) =
 f(x1, . . . , xn), if ∀xi, xi ∈ Xi and f achieves completion;∀yi, yi = ϕ, otherwise.
5.4.2 Behavioral Constraints
Fair exchange allows processes to exchange input values in a fair manner. Each
process inputs a value in exchange for a counterpart, of which it can verify the
validity. The computation is concluded when every process outputs either a
value yi, which is by definition the result of function f , or the abort value
ϕ, meaning that the computation aborted. The behavioral constraints of the
problem of fair exchange are described by the following set of properties.
Validity. If any correct process pi outputs a value yi, then either yi ∈ Yi
or yi = ϕ.
Uniqueness. No correct process outputs more than one value.
Non-triviality. If all processes are correct, no process outputs the abort
value ϕ.
Termination. Every correct process eventually outputs a value.
Privacy. No process pj outputs the input value xi or the output value yi of
any correct process pi, apart from what is possibly given away by inputs
and outputs of Byzantine processes.
Fairness. If any process pi outputs a value yi, with yi ∈ Yi, then every correct
process pj outputs a value yj, with yj ∈ Yj, unless pi is Byzantine and yi
is computable from the inputs of Byzantine processes.
6Since f is a permutation,
⋃n
i=1Xi =
⋃n
i=1 Yi.
7Byzantine behaviors may prevent the completion of the computation of f .
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This set of properties corresponds precisely to the six properties of the specifi-
cation of fair exchange presented in Section 1.3.2 (page 16). The descriptions
of these properties were translated into the new formalism and the integrity
property was renamed privacy in order to match the notion used in SMC.
The privacy and fairness properties are specific to the problem of fair ex-
change, i.e., they capture the essence of the problem. However, as discussed
in Section 1.3.2, other specifications of fair exchange usually rely on a sin-
gle property to capture these two notions [ASW00, AGGV05, PG99]. Our
set of six fine-grained properties describing fair exchange was first introduced
for clarity reasons, to capture the problem better and to facilitate reasoning
about the different results and solutions. The choice of two properties (privacy
and fairness), instead of just one, happens to be particularly relevant when
comparing SMC and FE, since SMC ensures only privacy.
5.5 Comparing SMC and FE
With both problems described using our integrated specification framework,
differences that were somehow hidden by implicit assumptions or merely be-
cause of the heterogeneous specifications, now become apparent. In this sec-
tion, we take a first look at the gap between SMC and FE. The differences
between the two problems obviously depend on the choices we made regarding
what to include in their definitions, in particular for SMC, whose exact defini-
tion is still up for debate. Nonetheless, the comparison provides an interesting
clarification of the relationship between SMC and FE. Are they equivalent? Is
one included in the other? Or do they just have a common intersection? In
the following, we answer these questions by pointing out that while SMC is a
more general problem, FE is stronger.
5.5.1 The Respective Strengths of SMC and FE
The first major difference is found in the generality of the function computed
in both problems. In SMC, the specification allows any function f to be
considered, whereas fair exchange only deals with permutations with no fixed
points and specific constraints on the inputs of all processes, as described by
the terms of the exchange. Secure multiparty computation is far more general
than fair exchange with respect to the range of functions it considers. In other
words, they are from different levels of abstraction.
The second explicit difference lies in the lists of properties. Fair exchange
ensures two properties, termination and fairness, not ensured by secure mul-
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tiparty computation. While these properties can be found in some particular
specifications of SMC, they do not belong to the specification commonly used
in the modern cryptography literature. Indeed, from [Gol04], we learn that a
peer cannot be prevented from abruptly interrupting any execution of SMC at
any time, which denies the possibility of ensuring termination. Since ensuring
true fairness obviously relies on the termination of any execution, this aspect
also impacts the possibility of ensuring fairness.
In fact, fairness is usually not considered in SMC, even though this might
seem the case from the emulation approach of a TTP-based ideal model. So
not only is fairness not ensured, it is also seldom discussed, hence the confusion
when comparing seemingly conflicting results in SMC and FE. Moreover, when
fairness is indeed mentioned in the context of SMC, it usually has a weaker
connotation. This last aspect is further discussed in the Section 5.6.
5.5.2 Towards Generalized Fair Computation
To summarize, SMC achieves more in terms of generality, while FE provides
two additional properties, i.e., termination and fairness. This leads us to
introduce a middle man in the form of a third problem, which provides both
the generality of secure multiparty computation and the set of properties of
fair exchange. This new problem, named generalized fair computation (GFC),
is the subject of Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the generality and security levels of the problems
and their relations.
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As illustrated in Figure 5.3, the GFC problem encompasses the same level of
abstraction as SMC, while being strictly stronger than SMC. Fair exchange is
simply a specific instance of the GFC problem. Similarly, a problem combining
the guaranties of SMC and the permutation function of FE would be a specific
instance of SMC, named secure exchange for example.
5.6 Origin of the Confusion
After describing and comparing secure multiparty computation and fair ex-
change from the perspective of a common specification framework, we can
now revisit the origins of the confusion between them. From their respective
literature, it is understandably difficult to distinguish precisely one from the
other, since they have much in common but are described using different vo-
cabularies. The main reason is probably to be found in the close connection
of both with the notion of trusted third party (TTP). In SMC, the TTP is
the ideal to reach for, and in FE, it is the only unconditional solution to the
problem. Moreover, a TTP ensures a large set of security properties but the
focus of each problem is on a different subset of these properties. Hereafter,
we propose a discussion, hopefully a clarification, on the possible origins of
confusion: (1) the seemingly contradictory results and (2) the TTP emulation
approach taken in SMC.
5.6.1 Contradictory Results?
On the one hand, when assuming an honest majority, SMC can be made un-
conditionally secure, even in the context of secure computation with unanimous
abort and complete fairness [RB89], i.e., fair computation. On the other hand,
as shown in Section 1.4, fair exchange is impossible to solve without at least
one identified process that all processes can trust. So either one of these results
is wrong or they are simply not addressing the same issue. Indeed, if these
two statements seem contradictory, it is because of their common context and
the lack of accuracy found in natural language, i.e., the notion implied by the
word fairness is different from one case to the other.
In the case of fair exchange, in order to respect the terms of the exchange, the
notion of fairness implies a constraint on the inputs of all processes, including
those of Byzantine processes. There is no such constraint in the case of fair
computation, since the validity of inputs of Byzantine processes is usually not
much of a concern. The concern is to ensure that adversaries may not obtain
information from the inputs of correct processes, i.e., either in absolute (pri-
vacy) or with respect to the information correct processes are able to obtain
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(fairness). In other words, what makes fair exchange more difficult to solve
than fair computation is the constraint on the inputs of all processes. The
verification of all the inputs is a key step in solving fair exchange in Byzantine
environments and needs to be done by some trusted process, be it a TTP or
trustees. This decisive difference in the notion of fairness also explains why the
domain of the function describing the SMC problem is usually not explicitly
defined, whereas it is a crucial element in fair exchange.
5.6.2 An Ideal Model?
The simulation approach was introduced in SMC in order to simplify the de-
scription of the behavioral constraints. The aim is to provide the same level
of security as a TTP but without a TTP, i.e., in a fully decentralized setting.
However, results from both fair exchange and secure multiparty computation
have shown that achieving the same level of security as a TTP is simply im-
possible. In order to make the emulation possible, certain properties ensured
by the TTP have to be dropped. For example, in the ideal model, malicious
processes are assumed to be able to interrupt the computation of the TTP, e.g.,
by cutting off all the communications with the TTP. While this assumption is
made because ensuring that the computation is not interrupted is indeed im-
possible in the real model, it is nonetheless contradictory with the very notion
of TTP.
In the light of the above restrictions on this alleged ideal model, one can argue
that introducing such an approach in order to avoid having to produce an
exhaustive list of properties ensured by SMC, e.g., correctness and privacy,
is slightly less convincing. First because the impossibility of unconditionally
emulating a TTP forces us to provide an exhaustive list of properties that
should be ignored in the TTP, e.g., fairness or termination. And secondly
because it is somewhat misleading to readers, who are not necessarily aware of
the implicit not-so-ideal model hidden behind the ideal model. Furthermore,
since the ability to interrupt the TTP in the ideal model is not so important
when considering privacy or correctness, this restriction is not always explicitly
stated in SMC papers.
♦♦♦
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Generalized Fair Computation
All generalizations are false, including this one.
Mark Twain
Abstract. Here, we present a new problem, named generalized fair computation.
The specification of this problem results from the fusion of fair exchange and se-
cure multiparty computation presented in the previous chapter, i.e., it bears the
generality of secure multiparty computation and the behavioral constraints of fair
exchange. Using our integrated specification framework, we describe this problem
and show that it can indeed be used as a black box in order to provide a solution
for both fair exchange and secure multiparty computation. Finally, we propose a
solution to the problem of generalized fair computation based on a secure multiparty
computation module and secure boxes.
6.1 Introduction
In order to bridge the conceptual gap between secure multiparty computa-
tion (SMC) and fair exchange (FE), we introduce the idea of generalized fair
computation (GFC). This arises from the fusion of FE and SMC by combining
the functional generality of SMC with the guarantees of fairness and termina-
tion of FE, as illustrated by the Yin-Yang symbol in Figure 6.1.
The goal of the GFC problem is to provide a generalization of the problem of
fair exchange. Figure. 6.2 shows a projection of the SMC, GFC, FE problems
with respect to two axes: the x -axis represents the level of security, or be-
havioral constraint, required by the problems, whereas the y-axis captures the
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Figure 6.1: Thesis outline.
level of generality of the functional definition of the problems. Accordingly,
SMC and GFC are on the same level of generality, while FE is simply a specific
instance of GFC that provides the same behavioral constraints. The two other
problems represented in Figure 6.2 are secure exchange (SE), which was briefly
mentioned in the previous chapter, and fair computation (FC). While the for-
mer was only introduced for illustration purposes, the latter is an important
problem of the SMC-related literature and corresponds to secure computation
with unanimous abort and complete fairness in the hierarchy of [GL02] pre-
sented in Section 5.1.
As with GFC and FE, fair computation also provides termination and fairness,
at least to a certain degree. However, while GFC is clearly more general than
FE, the difference between fair computation and generalized fair computation
may seem unclear. Nonetheless, fair computation, as described in the litera-
ture, relates to a subset of the functions captured in GFC, which in particular
does not include the permutation function of fair exchange.
6.1. Introduction 101
Secure Exchange
(SE)
Fair Exchange
(FE)
Generalized
Fair Computation
(GFC)
Fair Computation
(FC)
Subset of functions with 
infinite input domain.
Permutation function with 
specific input domain.
Permutation function with 
specific input domain.
Secure Multiparty
Computation
(SMC)
Add fairness &
termination.
Behavior Constraint Level
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 G
e
n
e
ra
li
ty
 L
e
v
e
l
Figure 6.2: The generality and security levels of the various problems.
6.1.1 Fair Computation, no Support for Fair Exchange
In the SMC-related literature, the fair computation problem is indeed obtained
by adding termination and fairness to secure multiparty computation, which in
appearance is the same as we suggest doing in order to produce generalized fair
computation. As discussed in Section 5.6, the apparent similarity depends on
the definition of fairness. In the case of fair computation, the weaker definition
of fairness actually implies a limited class of functions, i.e., functions that may
be computed without the inputs of Byzantine processes [RB89]. Accordingly,
including a verification of the input values in the definition of fairness is not
necessary. While this particular definition of fairness is sufficient to allow
certain specific functions to be computed in a truly fair manner and without
relying on a trusted process, it rules out fair exchange as being part of fair
computation.
The specification of the fair computation problem can also be defined from the
perspective of the GFC problem, i.e., as capturing a subset of the functions
of GFC. In this case, the fair computation provides the same properties as
GFC, including fairness, but the functional definition must explicitly restrict
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certain functions in order to match the SMC-related definition of fair compu-
tation and its impossibility results and lower bounds. Indeed, in the commonly
found definition of fair computation, when assuming an honest majority, the
solvability of the problem does not require a trusted process. The problem can
even be made unconditionally secure with respect to the number of Byzantine
processes by assuming that Byzantine processes have limited computational
power compared to correct processes [GMY04].
Interestingly, fair computation can be defined in various ways by changing the
level of security in the specification. However, there is a tradeoff between the
security level and the generality of the functional definition. In Figure. 6.2,
the dotted line between secure multiparty computation and fair computation
illustrates the fact that their connection is somewhat unclear. In any case, we
argue that the fair computation specification includes an implicit restriction
on the function considered, so that GFC is closer to SMC with respect to the
generality level of the functional definition, than is fair computation. Moreover,
GFC includes the problem of fair exchange, whereas the commonly found
definition of fair computation does not.
6.2 The Generalized Fair Computation (GFC)
Problem
The generalized fair computation problem consists in a group of processes
trying to compute the result of specific function in a fair manner. Intuitively,
fair means that, if one process obtains its desired output, then all processes
involved in the computation should also obtain their desired output. Similarly
to SMC, privacy and correctness need to be achieved but the main difficulty of
GFC resides in achieving fairness. The GFC problem also ensures termination,
since it is necessary to provide true fairness, whereas SMC ensures neither.
The specification of GFC is expressed using the integrated specification frame-
work presented in Section 5.2. We thus assume the same system model as in
Chapter 5, i.e., a distributed system consisting of a set Π of n fully intercon-
nected processes, Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. The system is synchronous and processes
may exhibit Byzantine behaviors.
6.2.1 Functional Definition
More formally, each process is required to compute the result of a deterministic
function F : (y1, . . . , yn) = F (x1, . . . , xn), where xi and yi are respectively the
inputs and outputs of process pi. When all processes are correct, the outcome
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of F is defined by a function f with input domain X = X1 × . . . × Xn and
output domain Y = Y1 × . . . × Yn: (y1, . . . , yn) = f(x1, . . . , xn). Function f
thus provides the outputs of F when the inputs are those expected, i.e., they
belong to the domain of f , and when the computation achieves completion.1
However, if such is not the case, F outputs a special value ϕ for all processes.
This special value ϕ indicates that the computation aborted. Function F is
thus defined as follows:
F (x1, . . . , xn) =
 f(x1, . . . , xn), if ∀xi, xi ∈ Xi and f achieves completion;∀yi, yi = ϕ, otherwise.
6.2.2 Behavioral Constraints
Generalized fair computation allows processes to compute, fairly and securely,
the result of a specific function, with each process providing an input value
and expecting to receive an output value as the result of the computation.
The computation is completed when every process outputs either a value yi,
which is by definition the result of function f , or the abort value ϕ, meaning
that the computation aborted. The behavioral constraints of the problem of
generalized fair computation are described by the following set of properties.
Validity. If any correct process pi outputs a value yi, then either yi ∈ Yi
or yi = ϕ.
Uniqueness. No correct process outputs more than one value.
Non-triviality. If all processes are correct, no process outputs the abort
value ϕ.
Termination. Every correct process eventually outputs a value.
Privacy. No process pj outputs the input value xi or the output value yi of
any correct process pi, apart from what is possibly given away by inputs
and outputs of Byzantine processes.
Fairness. If any process pi outputs a value yi, with yi ∈ Yi, then every correct
process pj outputs a value yj, with yj ∈ Yj, unless pi is Byzantine and yi
is computable from the inputs of Byzantine processes.
The addition of the termination and fairness properties to the list of prop-
erties of SMC has an influence on the validity property. Indeed, termination
1As for FE, certain Byzantine behaviors may interfere with the computation of f , possibly
preventing its completion.
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implies having a special abort value in cases where executions do not proceed
as expected. This obviously impacts the validity property which needs to be
modified to take into account the special outcomes.
Furthermore, the functional definition also has an impact on the validity prop-
erty, since it requires that all inputs be verified. Accordingly, in the validity
property, the correct outcome yi is computed with the inputs of all processes,
not just with at least the inputs of correct ones. However, in the case of
certain functions that may be correctly computed in the absence of inputs
from Byzantine processes, the input verification would arbitrarily restrict the
correct outcomes. A simple countermeasure to this drawback is achieved by
introducing an omission value ⊥ in each element Xi of the domain X. The
value ⊥ is then used in the computation of f in place of missing inputs of
Byzantine processes.
6.3 Using GFC for Solving SMC and FE
By construction, GFC is a generalization of FE and they both share the same
set of properties. Thus, building FE on top of GFC simply consists in defining
function f as a permutation, with no fixed points, and in limiting the input
and output domains, X and Y , to n singletons matching the terms of the
exchange. More interestingly, a solution to SMC can be built on top of GFC,
showing that the problem of GFC is indeed stronger than the the problem of
SMC.
6.3.1 An Algorithm for SMC based on GFC
Algorithm 6.1 provides a solution to SMC, with function f , relying on a specific
GFC module with function f ′ = f . The algorithm is fairly straightforward as
it first calls the input primitive of the GFC module and then, if that value is
not the abort value ϕ, it outputs the value provided by the GFC module.
Algorithm 6.1 SMC protocol executed by process pi
1: Uses: Generalized Fair Computation (GFC)
2: function input(xi)
3: GFC.input(xi) {call the input primitive of GFC}
4: upon GFC.output(y′i) do {GFC callback}
5: if y′i 6= ϕ then {check if value is not the abort value ϕ}
6: output(y′i) {output the result of GFC}
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Although the GFC module ensures termination, Algorithm 6.1 is consistent
with the specification of SMC and does not provide termination. Indeed, if
the output of GFC is the abort value ϕ, Algorithm 6.1 does not return any
value.
6.3.2 Correctness Proof
The correctness proof of Algorithm 6.1 is also fairly obvious since GFC ensures
exactly the same uniqueness, non-triviality and privacy properties as SMC.
Thus it only remains to show that Algorithm 6.1 ensures the validity property
of SMC.
Theorem 18 (Validity). If a correct process pi outputs a value yi, then yi was
computed using function f and with at least the inputs of all correct processes.
Proof. If the SMC module of a correct process pi outputs a value yi at line 6,
yi is any value y
′
i output by the GFC module at line 4, excluding the abort
value ϕ. From the validity property of GFC, either y′i ∈ Y ′ or y′i = ϕ. From
the definition of GFC, when y′i 6= ϕ, y′i is computed using f ′ and with the
inputs of all processes. So, since yi 6= ϕ and f ′ = f , yi was computed using
function f and with at least the inputs of all correct processes.
6.4 Solving GFC in the Absence of a TTP
In order to provide a solution to GFC without a TTP, we propose to com-
plete the model briefly introduced in Section 6.2 with a set Π′ of n trustees,
Π′ = {p′1, . . . , p′n}, which are processes known to be correct a priori. This en-
hanced system model corresponds to the one detailed in Section 2.2. The need
for trustees derives from the difficulty of ensuring fairness, discussed in Chap-
ter 2. We showed that the problem of fair exchange is impossible to solve
without at least one trusted process, i.e., a correct process identified a priori.
While this impossibility result was proven in the context of fair exchange, it is
consistent in the context of the GFC problem, since GFC is a generalization
of fair exchange. Accordingly, and to depart from the solution based on a
centralized trusted third party, we split the necessary trust among processes
by introducing the aforementioned set of trustees, where each trustee p′i is con-
nected to a distinct process pi, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. In this particular
solution, the trustees are merely tamperproof modules hosted by each process,
as first introduced in [AV03].
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Process
Trustee
Figure 6.3: Topology with five participants and their trustees.
Communication channels are said to be perfect links (PL), which provide send
and deliver primitives (respectively PL.send() and PL.deliver()) and ensure the
reliable delivery, no duplication and no creation properties described in Sec-
tion 1.2. The synchronous system assumption implies that delivery will occur
within some known time bound ∆PL.
Another important result from Chapter 2 is that the solvability of fair ex-
change, and by extension GFC, is conditioned by the number of Byzantine
processes that a certain topology may sustain. The maximum number b of
Byzantine processes sustainable in this particular topology is b = dn
2
− 1e, i.e.,
there must be an honest majority.
6.4.1 Relying on Specific Modules
Our GFC protocol relies on three building blocks: an SMC module, as pre-
sented in Section 5.3, a Byzantine agreement module and a secure box module,
playing the role of the trustee.2 Figure 6.4 presents the layering of the modules,
where only the code of the secure box is tamperproof.
Secure Box (SB)
The secure box module corresponds to the module introduced in Section 3.3. It
is a simple tamperproof device corresponding to the notion of trustee. Secure
box modules rely completely on their hosts in order to communicate with
each other. Thus, a module may be isolated from others, if it is hosted by a
Byzantine process. A participant communicates with it by directly invoking
primitives. The secure box can be seen as a local service available to each
participant. Through the use of a public key infrastructure (PKI), its role is
merely one of a safe. The SB device offers the following set of primitives.
2In the following, the terms secure box and trustee are used indifferently.
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Figure 6.4: A layered diagram of the modules involved in Algorithm 6.2.
SB.isValidOutput(yi) – Returns a boolean value stating whether the encrypted
value yi is valid, i.e., if yj ∈ Yi.3
SB.unseal(yi,proof) – Returns the deciphered value yj, if the proof of fairness,
i.e., a majority of clues issued by other processes, is valid.
SB.sign(m) – Returns a signed version of a message m. Signature is done
using the private key of p′i, i.e., the secure box of process pi.
Byzantine Agreement (BA)
The Byzantine agreement module is identical to the one presented in Sec-
tion 3.3. Intuitively, it allows processes to broadcast messages reliably, in
spite of Byzantine failures. We briefly recall here the primitives and properties
provided by such a module; see the aforementioned section for more details.
BA.start(pj) – Enables a process pi to start an execution of BA in order to
receive a message from a process pj. For each execution of the protocol,
every correct process calls the start primitive at the same time (see timing
assumption discussion in Section 2.4) and process pj then calls the send
primitive.
BA.send(pi,m) – Enables a process pi to broadcast a message m reliably to
all processes.
BA.deliver(pj,S) – Works as a callback and enables a process pj to receive a
set S of messages as the result of a reliable broadcast. Possible outcomes
are: (1) S is a singleton, if the sender behaved correctly; (2) S contains
3The encryption is done using the module’s public key, so the item remains out of reach
of the process.
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more than one message, if the sender behaved incorrectly by sending
different messages to different processes; (3) S is the empty set, if the
sender did not send anything.
The goal is to prevent Byzantine processes from threatening agreement among
correct processes and ensure the two following interactive consistency (IC)
properties.
IC1. If a correct process delivers a set S of messages, then every correct
process delivers S.
IC2. If a correct process sends a message m, then every correct process even-
tually delivers the set {m}.
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
The SMC module provides an implementation of the specification of secure
multiparty computation defined in Section 5.3, with function f ′. The function
is dependent of the desired functional definition of the GFC implementation
provided by Algorithm 6.2. Thus, assuming that the functional definition of
the GFC problem is function f , function f ′ is defined by
(y′1, . . . , y
′
n) = f
′(x1, . . . , xn)
= (encrypt1(f1(x1, . . . , xn)), . . . , encryptn(fn(x1, . . . , xn))).
Intuitively, function f ′ is identical to function f but the outputs are encrypted
using the public keys of the respective secure boxes, i.e., the output of process pi
is encrypted with the public key of its secure box p′i.
6.4.2 An Algorithm Solving GFC
For sake of simplicity, we assume that all correct processes have local clocks
which are synchronized within some fixed maximum drift [PSL80], so they are
able to start the algorithm roughly at the same time. We also assume that upon
actions are executed atomically with respect to one another. Our algorithm
is divided into three phases: (1) SMC, (2) voting and (3) clue exchange. The
three-phase structure of Algorithm 6.2 is similar to that of Algorithm 3.1. How-
ever, the first phase, SMC, replaces the item exchange phase of Algorithm 3.1
and allows for the generalization of the protocol. Thus, an important implica-
tion is the replacement at line 14 of the delay ∆PL by the value ∆SMC. Since
the system is synchronous, the ∆SMC delay of the first phase is computable as
a function of the ∆PL perfect-link delay and function f
′.
6.4. Solving GFC in the Absence of a TTP 109
Algorithm 6.2 Generalized fair computation protocol executed by pi
1: Uses: Perfect Link (PL), Byzantine Agreement (BA), Secure Box (SB), Secure Multiparty
Computation (SMC)
2: Initialisation:
3: t0 ← time() {set t0 to starting time}
4: output← false {set variable to false}
5: sealedValue← ⊥ {set variable to null}
6: votes, clues← ∅ {set variables to empty set}
7: function input(xi)
8: SMC.input(xi) {call the SMC module}
9: upon SMC.output(y′i) do {SMC callback}
10: sealedValue← y′i {store received value}
11: if SB.isValidOutput(sealedValue) then {asks SB to check value}
12: vote← SB.sign(‘proceed’) {produce proceed vote}
13: BA.send(pi, vote) {send vote}
14: upon time() > t0 +∆SMC do {SMC phase is over}
15: for all pj ∈ Π do {for all processes}
16: BA.start(pj) {start BA}
17: upon BA.deliver(pj , vote) ∧ (¬output) do {BA callback and not output}
18: if validProceedVote(vote) then {check vote}
19: votes← votes ∪ vote {add pj’s vote to set}
20: if (|votes| = n) then {if all votes are proceed}
21: for all pk ∈ Π do
22: clue← SB.sign(votes) {produce clue}
23: PL.send(pi, pk, ‘clue’, clue) {send clue}
24: else
25: output← true {set variable to true}
26: output(ϕ) {output ϕ}
27: upon PL.deliver(pj , pi, ‘clue’, clue) ∧ (¬output) do {PL callback and not output}
28: if validClue(clue) then {check if message is valid}
29: clues← clues ∪ {clue} {add pj’s clue to set}
30: if (|clues| > n/2) then {check if majority of clues}
31: output← true {set variable to true}
32: yi ← SB.unseal(sealedValue, clues) {unseal value using SB}
33: output(yi) {output the unsealed value}
SMC phase. The first phase of the algorithm allows every process to obtain
an encrypted version of the output using the SMC module (line 8). The output
has to be encrypted, since the receiving process must not be able to have direct
access to it upon reception (line 9). The encryption is thus made using the
public key of the SB module of the receiving process. The secure box acts
as a safe, so that the process only has access to the output at the end of the
protocol.
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Voting phase. In this phase, process pi sends its vote to every process to
inform them that it holds the expected output, and waits to receive the vote of
every process. Thus, once pi receives the encrypted output, it queries its secure
module to validate the output from SMC and starts the voting phase. The
process signs and broadcasts its proceed vote (line 13) using BA, indicating
that it has received the expected output. It also starts BA for each process in
order to synchronize with all the other correct processes. Upon reception of a
vote, the validProceedVote() function checks if the delivered set is a singleton
containing the valid proceed vote of the sender (line 18). If the vote is
valid, it is added to the set of votes. Once all the votes are gathered, a process
knows that every process has voted proceed and has thus received the correct
output. With that information, process pi signs and sends the n votes – called
the i-th clue – to every process (line 23). This is necessary in order to enter
the final phase, which consists in having processes exchange their clues. Note
that nothing prevents some Byzantine process pk from producing its vote and
its clue without having previously received its output. However such behavior
cannot prejudice any process other than pk.
Clue exchange phase. In this phase, process pi sends its clue to every
process and waits to receive the clues from a majority of processes (line 30).
Upon reception of a clue, the validClue() function checks if the clue contains
a signed set of all n proceed votes (line 28). With dn+1
2
e clues, it asks its
secure module to release the sealed output by deciphering it using its private
key (line 32). The majority is necessary to ensure that at least one correct
process was able to produce its i-th clue in order for any process to release its
item. At this stage, correct processes should be able to release without the
help of any Byzantine process; on the contrary, Byzantine processes should
not be able to release without the help of at least one correct process.
6.4.3 Correctness Proof
In the following, we prove that Algorithm 6.2 solves GFC in the presence of b
Byzantine processes, with b < n
2
. The restriction on the number of Byzantine
processes is called the honest majority assumption. Our correctness proof aims
at showing that Algorithm 6.2 preserves the validity, uniqueness, non-triviality,
termination, privacy and fairness properties of GFC. Based on Lemma 5, the
respective theorems hereafter validate each of these properties. The notation
p′i describing a trustee or a secure box is equivalent to the SB notation used in
Algorithm 6.2.
Lemma 5. If some correct process pj does not receive an encrypted value y
′
j
at line 9, with y′j ∈ Yj, then no process releases at line 33 of Algorithm 6.2.
6.4. Solving GFC in the Absence of a TTP 111
Proof. If some correct process pj does not receive an encrypted value y
′
j at
line 9, with y′j ∈ Yj, it does not send a proceed vote. Thus no process obtains
the proceed vote from pj. Since no process receives all n proceed votes,
and since a clue is composed of a signed set of n proceed votes, no process
produces its clue. From the no creation property of perfect links, no process
receives any clue. Without a majority of clues, no process is able to unseal the
item at line 32 and hence to release the item at line 33 of Algorithm 6.2.
Theorem 19 (Validity). If any correct process pi outputs a value yi, then
either yi ∈ Yi or yi is the abort item ϕ.
Proof. A correct process pi explicitly outputs the abort item ϕ at line 26, and
the only other case of output is at line 33. In the latter case, pi outputs the
value that is stored in variable sealedValue. From Lemma 5, if pi outputs at
line 33, it has previously received a value y′i, with y
′
i ∈ Yi, and stored it in
variable sealedValue at line 10. Since, from the uniqueness property of SMC,
the callback from SMC is triggered only once at line 9, pi outputs a value y
′
i,
with y′i ∈ Yi.
Theorem 20 (Uniqueness). No correct process outputs more than one value.
Proof. The boolean variable output and the atomic execution assumption pre-
vent any correct process from outputting more than one value.
Theorem 21 (Non-triviality). If all processes are correct, no process outputs
the abort value ϕ.
Proof. Since all processes are correct, each process inputs a value xi at line 8,
with xi ∈ Xi. From the non-triviality property of SMC and the synchronous
system assumption, every process pj receives an encrypted value y
′
j, with y
′
j ∈
Yj, before time t1 = t0 + ∆SMC,
4 so every process produces and sends in a
timely fashion its proceed vote at line 13. From the IC2 property of BA, no
process receives an invalid proceed vote. Therefore, no process outputs the
abort value ϕ (line 26).
Theorem 22 (Termination). Every correct process eventually outputs a value.
Proof. The time-out at line 14 ensures that every correct process starts all n
executions of BA at the same time. This implies that, from the existence of
a time bound for the termination of BA and the IC1 property of BA, there
is a time after which, either every correct process receives at least one invalid
4Since the system is synchronous, a reasonable delay ∆SMC is computable as a function
of the perfect link delay ∆PL and function f ′.
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proceed vote and releases the abort value ϕ, or every correct process receives
all n valid proceed votes. In the latter case, every correct process then
produces and sends its i-th clue at line 23. From the reliable delivery property
of perfect links and the honest majority assumption, every correct process
receives a majority of clues and then outputs at line 33.
Theorem 23 (Privacy). No process pj outputs the input value xi or the output
value yi of any correct process pi, apart from what is possibly given away by
inputs and outputs of Byzantine processes.
Proof. Only during the execution of the SMC module, i.e., at line 8, are the
input and output values of a correct process pi (possibly) transmitted through
the network. From the privacy property of SMC, during that execution, no
process pj obtains the input value xi or the output value yi of any correct
process pi, apart from what is possibly given away by inputs and outputs of
Byzantine processes. Hence nor does pj output such values.
Theorem 24 (Fairness). If any process pi outputs a value yi, with yi ∈ Yi,
then every correct process pj outputs a value yj, with yj ∈ Yj, unless pi is
Byzantine and yi is computable from the inputs of Byzantine processes.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some correct process pj does not output a value yj, with yj ∈ Yj,
and that some other process pi outputs a value yi, with yi ∈ Yi and yi not
computable from the inputs of Byzantine processes. From assumptions on
SB and because yi is not computable from the inputs of Byzantine processes,
pi needs a majority of clues in order to output yi. Thus, if pi outputs yi
(line 33), pi receives a majority of clues in some previous steps. From the honest
majority assumption, at least one of these clues is produced by some correct
process px. Process px therefore received all n proceed votes. Thus, from the
IC1 property of BA, every correct process receives all n proceed votes. This
implies that no correct process outputs the abort value ϕ (line 26), including pj.
From the validity and termination properties of GFC, if pj does not output the
abort value ϕ, then pj outputs a value yj, with yj ∈ Yj. A contradiction.
♦♦♦
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Conclusion
I think it’s the excitement only a free man can feel, a free man at
the start of a long journey whose conclusion is uncertain.
I hope I can make it across the border.
I hope to see my friend, and shake his hand.
I hope the Pacific is as blue as it has been in my dreams.
I hope.
Morgan Freeman as Red, “The Shawshank Redemption”
Research Assessment
The aim of the thesis was to provide a study on the solvability of the problem
of fair exchange in the context of a synchronous system model with Byzantine
failures.
Analyzing the Solvability of Fair Exchange
The first contribution of the thesis was to present a study of the solvability of
fair exchange in a general context and its links with the notion of trust. Discus-
sion of solutions and solvability conditions requires a clearly defined problem.
As argued, definitions found in the literature were somewhat inadequate for
our use, since they were not relevant for any number of processes. We thus
introduced a novel specification of the problem of fair exchange composed of
elemental properties.
The first step towards discussing the solvability of fair exchange was to show
that it is simply impossible in a context where no process can be trusted. This
impossibility result was obtained despite assuming a fully connected network,
lessening the potential power of Byzantine processes over the communication
channels. The two solutions – the trusted third party (TTP) [BP90] and the
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guardian angels [AV03] – provided the basis for our extension of the general
model. The usual distributed system model, composed of a set of processes,
was completed with a set of trusted processes (trustees), known to be correct
a priori. This allowed a flexible representation of the notion of trust, which
we showed was necessary in order to solve fair exchange. Furthermore, the
network topology assumptions were generalized to connected graphs, allowing
for a greater diversity of settings.
In this new context, we defined the reachable majority condition, a connectivity
condition stating that, for any failure pattern, each correct processes must be
connected by a reliable path to a majority of trustees. We then showed that
fair exchange is solvable if and only if the reachable majority condition is met.
In order to prove the second part, sufficiency, we provided a general solution
achieving fair exchange for any network topology and any maximum number of
Byzantine processes respecting the reachable majority condition. Solvability
of fair exchange is thus linked to the tradeoff between the connectivity of a
given network topology and the number of Byzantine processes.
Providing a Realistic Solution
With a better understanding of the conditions under which fair exchange is
solvable, our next step was to provide a fully-decentralized, yet realistic, solu-
tion. This required a specific network topology, similar to the one assumed in
the guardian angels solution [AV03]. The context was thus of a fully connected
network of processes, with each trustee connected exclusively to its correspond-
ing process. The idea behind this setting was to decentralize the trust among
processes fully by having each of them host an embedded tamperproof module
playing the role of the trustee.
The second step towards envisaging real deployment of the solution through,
for example, the use of smart cards, was to limit the role of the trustee as
much as possible. We thus presented an algorithm solving fair exchange that
only relies on the tamperproof modules in limited key steps of the protocol.
This modular decentralized algorithm can be seen as a building block and a
first step towards achieving peer-to-peer m-business solutions.
An implementation was then provided in the context of a pedagogical visual-
ization tool, in which executions of our fair exchange protocol can be configured
and monitored through a graphical display. While the application illustrates
the difficulty of fair exchange, its realization also allows for the description of
a procedure to implementing a wide range of Byzantine behaviors.
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Discussing Related Problems
While we were confident in our results on the solvability of fair exchange, re-
sults in the field of modern cryptography for the problem of secure multiparty
computation were found to be strangely contradictory to ours, since both prob-
lems are at first glance quite similar. This forced us to go back and investigate
the specifications of the problems.
The main difficulty in comparing fair exchange and secure multiparty compu-
tation is that the descriptions and approaches used in their respective fields
differ greatly. We thus introduced a common specification framework in order
to describe both problems, which allowed us to distinguish better one from the
other and threw light on the possible origins of the confusion between them.
The comparison of fair exchange and secure multiparty computation led us
to describe the problem of generalized fair computation, a generalization of
fair exchange. We solved the new problem by generalizing our solution to fair
exchange with a module implementing secure multiparty computation.
Future Research
Asynchronous fair exchange? We have seen that fair exchange is a dif-
ficult problem that was shown to be impossible in certain contexts. While
assuming a synchronous system model is not sufficient to allow fair exchanges
in the absence of trust, it plays an important role for ensuring termination, a
crucial property for providing fairness. However, possible future work would
investigate fair exchange in the context of an asynchronous system model with
failure detectors. As shown in [DGG02], failure detection in the context of
Byzantine failure is problematic, nonetheless there is some room for partial
Byzantine failure detection.
Extending the solution to GFC? Another possible direction for future
research is to provide a solution to generalized fair computation in the context
of a model assuming connected graphs, i.e., extended from the fully connected
case. If we consider the two fair exchange protocols of Chapters 2 and 3, and
the GFC protocol of Chapter 6, we see that the general solution of Chap-
ter 2 and the GFC solution can be viewed as generalizations of the modular
solution of Chapter 3. The modular algorithm is a solution to fair exchange
in the context of a specific network topology, where processes are fully con-
nected and trustees are only connected to their corresponding processes. The
general solution to fair exchange of Chapter 2 is thus a generalization with re-
spect to assumptions on the network topology, whereas the GFC solution is a
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generalization of the functional definition. Combining the two generalizations
might thus produce a solution to GFC for any network topology that can be
represented as a connected graph.
Graceful degradation? When producing our modular solution to fair ex-
change, the focus was on trying to reduce as much as possible the use of
the secure box modules. However, the specific network topology implies that
the solution requires an honest majority of processes. If a half or more pro-
cesses are Byzantine, fairness is simply no longer ensured. As we have shown
this is indeed a lower bound in order to ensure true fairness, nonetheless an
interesting feature of the guardian angels protocol is its ability to degrade
gracefully [AGGV05]. A possible extension to our work would thus be to im-
plement the graceful degradation of [AGGV05], while preserving the limited
role of the secure boxes.
Final Word
The aim of the thesis was indeed to provide a study on the solvability of the
problem of fair exchange in the context of a synchronous system model with
Byzantine failures. This led us on the long winding path of research, with its
aches and pains, its trials and errors, its ups and downs. While, on the verge of
reaching the end, the destination is now felt to be a worthwhile achievement,
it can only give the slightest glimpse of what has been discovered during the
journey. However, for the last step, we have concluded with the concrete – our
research contributions – since experience and personal growth can only be the
beginning of the next journey.
♦♦♦
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